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The idea of civil society contains a set of assumptions about the unity of civil society, the civility 
of civil society, the ‘separateness’ of civil society and the state, and the intrinsic relationship 
between civil society and democracy.  All of these assumptions can be questioned by examining 
civil society in a specific country context.  In the case of Ghana, processes in civil society have 
always entailed elements of participation, exclusion and manipulation of the idea of 
participation for the purposes of exclusion.  The subsequent hegemonic deployment of the idea of 
civil society did not transform these earlier processes of participation/exclusion into something 
radically different.  Nevertheless, the idea of civil society does have implications.  It provides a 
new way of obfuscating reality and legitimizing exclusion, while concurrently genuinely 
empowering some sections of society.  This thesis attempts to understand civil society in Africa 
by analytically separating ‘civil society’ into civil society as idea and civil society as process.  It 
examines them as separate entities with their own logic and then looks at how they interact in the 
1990s to produce a new set of circumstances in Ghanaian politics in particular, and African 
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In contemporary African political studies, the concept of civil society appears 
everywhere.  From about 1990, debates surrounding African ‘democratization’ have often been 
stamped by a hegemonic idea of civil society.  In its original conceptualization in political 
philosophy, civil society was not a thing to be studied but a theoretical construct used to 
understand observed phenomena.  With its recent revival, civil society has become more the 
object of research and less an analytical category.  The need to add new elements to existing 
theories or devise an entire new theory to understand political changes in Africa was a driving 
force in raising the concept of civil society and the possibility of a civil society theory to its 
current heights.  This need brought with it the desire to realize civil society’s potential as both a 
conceptual tool and as a key to constructive change on the ground in Africa (see Harbeson 1994).   
As a result, the literature on civil society in Africa is subsumed in a debate over the 
theoretical, analytical and empirical usefulness of the concept (see for example the essays 
contained in Harbeson, Rothchild, and Chazan 1994).  Three related issues dominate the debate: 
(1) how to conceptualize civil society; (2) whether civil society helps us to understand the 
political and socioeconomic processes in African countries; and (3) to what extent it is possible 
to operationalize civil society for empirical analysis and research.  While a full explanation of the 
different levels of the debate and various strands of arguments would consume the whole 
introduction, the amount of academic disagreement revealed in these works over the viability of 
civil society as a concept in all its guises can be summed up as follows: 
Civil society is indeed an elusive concept and a more fugitive reality.  But the remarkable energies devoted 
to its definition and pursuit strike me as the most powerful force on the scene.  The quest for a civil society 
that can reinvent the state in its own admittedly idealized image is a drama of redemption whose potential 
nobility commands our admiration  (Young 1994: 48). 
 
Furthermore, the ambiguous nature of the civil society concept facilitates the 
multiplication of its meaning to the extent that some scholars think the concept meaningless.  A 
vicious circle may exist where the more inchoate and polymorphous the definition of civil 
society, the more appealing the concept becomes, and the more appealing, the less attainable it is 
in any substantial form (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999).  Despite efforts of scholars to develop 
systematic theories of civil society, its ontological status remains unclear: Is it a social domain? 
A type of institution or practice? A normative condition?  A metaphor for the hope of a better 
world?  If the concept of civil society obscures more than it illuminates in African politics, 
should the concept be discarded?   
This thesis attempts to transcend the debate by devising a new approach to studying civil 
society, while at the same time unraveling the complex of normative principles and observable 
actions that has become enmeshed in the concept of civil society.  This new approach is based on 
the argument that civil society is not a structured, unified entity, and thus cannot be the object of 
empirical research.  Instead of setting out to study ‘civil society,’ this research began with a 
focus on the following general questions.  First, what is it that social scientists are trying to 
capture with the concept of civil society that might be useful to understanding political processes 
and political change in Africa?  Second, how might this element be described and reformulated QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS92    Page 5 
 
in a more fruitful way?  Ghana was chosen as a case country to provide a specific context within 
which to examine these questions, partly due to the large amount of existing secondary literature 
on the history, politics and ‘civil society’ of Ghana and partly due to my nascent interest in this 
country. 
The conceptual framework presented below separates the non-entity ‘civil society’ into 
civil society as idea and civil society as process.  Civil society as idea focuses on the use of ‘civil 
society’ in the literature, as well as how individuals, organizations, the government and 
international actors in Ghana conceive of civil society and perceive of themselves in relation to 
it.  Civil society as process embodies a historical approach, placing the current dynamics of 
political activism and social organizations within the context of a longer view of changing state-
society relations in Ghana.  In contrast to previous approaches to studying civil society, the 
object of my research is both concept and reality, and the interaction between the two.   A 
description of this conceptual framework is illustrated in Chart 1.1 and further elaborated below.  
 
Chart 1.1 


















The idea of civil society embodies a set of assumptions about the unity of civil society, 
the civility of civil society, the ‘separateness’ of civil society and the state, and the intrinsic 
relationship between civil society and democracy.  These assumptions and the normative 
principles underlying them obfuscate reality.  Presuppositions about ‘civil society’ can be 
deconstructed by examining what is actually happening, denoted in this thesis as civil society as 
process.  Civil society as process takes on country specific characteristics resulting from the 
following determinants: (1) historically generated issues which affect particular groups in society 
or society as a whole; (2) structures and forms that organized social forces adopt to address these 
issues; (3) personal networks revealing who is involved in particular issues and why; (4) external 
influences and international linkages; and (5) material incentives underlying production politics 
and the distribution of state resources.  Civil society as process is shaped by changes in these 
determinants and the historical memory within social groups regarding past mobilization and its 
effects.   
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However, the idea of civil society has strongly influenced the perceptions and actions of 
multiple sets of actors.  Through these influences, the idea affects reality.  These effects are most 
pronounced now, as the junction between civil society as process and civil society as idea occurs 
largely in the 1990s.  This thesis uses the case of Ghana to explore civil society as process, to 
deconstruct presuppositions created by the idea of civil society, and to examine the ways in 
which the idea affects reality and the consequences of these effects.   
The processes symbolized by the arrows in Chart 1.1 are elaborated in the following 
chapters.  Chapter Two explains further the necessity for creating an analytical distinction 
between civil society as idea and civil society as process.  It sketches a framework to help 
understand the complexity and range of issues surrounding these two concepts.  Chapter Three 
looks in detail at the assumptions embodied in civil society as idea and how these assumptions 
make it difficult to understand actual processes in civil society.  It also demonstrates how this 
idea influences the perceptions and actions of multiple categories of actors and begins to describe 
the effects of this influence on reality.  Chapter Four covers civil society as process in Ghana 
from the Nationalist movement under British colonial rule until the inauguration of the Fourth 
Republic.  This chapter helps to deconstruct civil society as idea by looking back at the period 
when this hegemonic idea was not the dominant prismatic lens through which to interpret 
Ghanaian politics.  It also initiates the search for another way of understanding changes and 
continuities in state-society relations in Ghana.   
Building on Chapters Three and Four, Chapter Five examines how civil society as idea 
connects with existing processes of civil society in Ghana that contain elements of participation, 
exclusion and manipulation of the idea of participation for the purposes of exclusion.  It shows 
how the idea of civil society becomes another tool for various actors interacting in these 
processes.  In some cases, the idea of civil society forms the complete idiom through which 
actors engage each other over issues of participation and exclusion.  In concluding, Chapter Six 
summarizes the ways in which civil society as idea affects reality and suggests positive and 
negative implications of these effects.  It also indicates the usefulness of civil society as process 
for understanding changes and continuities in Ghanaian politics in particular, and Africa in 
general.  Finally, it looks at the relevance of ‘civil society’ as discussed in this thesis for notions 
of ‘democracy’. 
The major findings of this thesis can be grouped under three categories: civil society as 
idea, civil society as process and how the idea affects the process.  Historically, the idea of civil 
society provided a medium for positing solutions to the social problems of the day.  This legacy 
has carried over to the contemporary period, where the idea serves as a means for articulating 
visions of ‘meaningful’ democracy in Africa.  As a metaphor for social change, the idea of civil 
society becomes a normative battleground for intellectuals, where ideological principles and 
empirical evidence intermingle in social theories attempting simultaneously to explain the world 
and change it. 
Regarding civil society as process, this thesis finds that the characteristics of civil society 
and the struggles of organized social forces over the state, and against the state, reveal deep-
rooted processes in Ghanaian politics.  Since the Nationalist movement, social organizations 
have mobilized and formed alliances to change the nature of state-society relations and to 
participate in national decision-making.  While their attempts often proved unsuccessful, one 
outcome is the politicization of social organizations that served as informal channels of political 
mobilization and representation.  The parallel process of politicization of social groups but 
limited participation in governance, due to the inclusion of some groups to the exclusion of 
others, constitutes a driving force in Ghanaian politics.  This process, combined with historical QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS92    Page 7 
 
memory and changes in access to material and organizational resources, offers great insight into 
Ghana’s checkered history of military and civilian regimes and the significant changes occurring 
since political liberalization in the Fourth Republic.  The relevance of civil society as process for 
any notion of ‘democracy’ lies in a shift towards new methods of participation for previously 
excluded groups. 
The third major finding of this thesis concerns the way civil society as idea affects civil 
society as process.  The idea increased its scope of influence through linkages between Western 
academics and African academics, between academics and donors agencies, and between 
academics and international NGOs.  The agendas of both donors and international NGOs affect 
African governments and local social organizations.  As a result of these linkages in Ghana, we 
see the construction of ‘civil society’ occurring through a process where multiple categories of 
social actors employ the idea to achieve their objectives.  This leads to conflicting notions of 
what civil society is and what its role ought to be, and ‘civil society’ becomes the new terrain of 
struggle within existing processes.  The hegemonic deployment of the idea of civil society also 
leads towards its institutionalization.  Based on the argument that civil society is not static but a 
continuous and changing process, attempts to institutionalize ‘civil society’ may have more 
negative than positive implications.  However, the idea of civil society, in combination with 
historically-generated issues and political initiatives, may allow organized social forces the 
necessary leverage to create new institutions of governance that have not yet been envisioned, 
but would be the synthesis of struggles at the national level over notions of representation and 
participation. 
The research design incorporates primary and secondary sources of information.  
Secondary sources provide the historical context for analyzing civil society as process in Ghana, 
and they constitute the basis of the literature review on ‘civil society’ in Africa presented in 
Chapter Three.  Web-based sources of information have been used to a limited degree, for 
acquiring information on the World Bank, SAPRIN and the global SAPRI process.  Primary 
sources, obtained during a period of fieldwork in Accra, Ghana from July to September 2001, 
include semi-structured, open-ended interviews with leading members of social organizations, 
documents and literature of these organizations, books and pamphlets published in Ghana and 
limited participant observation.  Fieldwork was a critical element of the research strategy, for 





















Idea and Process: A Conceptual Framework 
 
Civil society is not a thing, and trying to study it as a thing contributes to the persistence 
of an illusion.
1  Civil society may have a function, but one that evades description or explanation 
through an analysis of a structured entity called ‘civil society’.  As Chapter One pointed out, 
what does exist is civil society as idea and civil society as process.  Civil society as idea is a 
unified symbol that conceals disunity, whereas civil society as process is a series of ephemeral 
unified postures in relation to transient issues with no sustained consistency of purpose.  Civil 
society as idea conceals real history and power relations, while civil society as process reveals 
power relations between social forces.  Nevertheless, civil society as idea has substantial political 
implications, as will become evident through this thesis, and thus is treated as a compelling 
object of analysis.  Building on these differences between civil society as idea and as process, 
this chapter presents a conceptual framework for each concept.  The purpose of these 
frameworks is to provide the analytical tools used in the remaining chapters.  
 
2.1  Civil Society as Idea 
 
A subject of interest to many political philosophers, ‘civil society’ has a long and 
complicated history.  More significantly, the civil society concept reappeared in the late 1980s, 
propelled by events in Eastern Europe.  Its reappearance led to the increasingly popular exercise 
of constructing the genesis and genealogy of this concept.  The first component of the conceptual 
framework shows how and with what intentions scholars have created a genealogy of the civil 
society concept and how that informs their contemporary political analyses.  Notably, many 
academics base their search for civil society in Africa on these works, or themselves take up 
similar approaches in understanding the history of this concept.  The second component looks at 
how the idea travels from intellectual discourse to the everyday vocabulary of national 
newspapers and local social organizations, and the implications of this general characteristic of 
social theory for the specific study of civil society as idea. 
A diverse body of literature tells a very similar story about the genesis and genealogy of 
the civil society concept, despite disagreements among authors over its interpretation and 
analytical value (see Cohen and Arato 1992; Keane 1988; Seligman 1992).  This literature 
sketches the metamorphosis of civil society as idea that can start as far back as Cicero and 
Aristotle, travel through the writings of Kant, Hobbes, Rousseau, Locke, then on to Ferguson and 
Smith, Hegel and Marx, lingering longer on de Tocqueville and Gramsci, and ending with 
Habermas.  Interestingly, the actual term ‘civil society’ does not even appear until the 18
th 
century, but authors such as Seligman (1992) find its essence within the writings of the early 
political philosophers nonetheless.   
It appears that many authors engage in this genealogy creation in order to propose their 
interpretation of civil society in a contemporary context, an interpretation laden with 
prescription.  The instrumental use of ‘civil society’ to present normative ideals is not new, for 
the idea of civil society has long served as a model for conceiving the workings of society and 
positing new models of social order (Cox 1999).  In its European origins, both Hegel and Smith 
                                                  
1 This paragraph is adapted from Abrams (1988) and his discussion on the difference between the idea of the state 
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attempted to reconcile the contradictions between the realm of individual particular interests and 
the realm of universality embodied in the state by drawing upon civil society to create the basis 
of common welfare out of the pursuit of particular interests.  In 19
th century America, de 
Tocqueville saw a proliferation of peoples’ voluntary associations as a guarantee against a 
tyranny of the majority that might result from populist politics.  In Italy of the 1930s, Gramsci 
prescribes the proper relation between the state and civil society as one where the state rests upon 
the support of an active, self-conscious and variegated civil society.  Even Cox concludes his 
archaeology of the idea of civil society with his own prescription: 
Civil society has become the crucial battleground for recovering citizen control of public life.  It seems that 
very little can be accomplished towards fundamental change through the state system as it now exists.  That 
system might be reconstructed on the basis of a reinvigorated civil society which could only come about 
through a long term position of war (1999: 27-8). 
 
Even those who criticize the normative theorizing that enters discussions on civil society 
cannot escape the temptation themselves.  For example, Hawthorn points out the subjectivity in 
the arguments of Cohen and Arato (1992): 
In one of the most extensive discussions, Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato have argued that the idea of civil 
society can and should be deployed in favour of claims for the ‘welfare state’ against economic liberalism, 
for participation against representation, and for ‘communitarianism against a rights-based state’ (Hawthorn 
2001: 276). 
 
However, Hawthorn’s argument contains its own subjective vision of democratic politics in the 
‘South’, where the power of ‘civil society’ would consist in its associations and organizations 
being able to meet the interests of those for whom they exist rather than battling ‘the state’. 
Finally, some contemporaries reject both the analytical and normative utility of ‘civil 
society’.  For example, Kumar (1993: 390) suggests that the language and terms of concepts such 
as constitutionalism, citizenship and democracy cover concerns about the abuses of state power 
without invoking ‘civil society’, and Seligman (1992: 206) describes the inadequacy of the idea 
of civil society as a solution to contemporary impasses in Western democratic societies.   
In addition to the baggage civil society as idea carries with it as a result of these past and 
present uses, the search for ‘civil society’ in Africa embodies its own obstacles and possibilities.  
It has been argued that the application of  ‘civil society’ in the ‘South’ is necessarily problematic 
because it forms part of a universal language, emanating from the West, which tries to describe a 
universe that is inherently particular (Kaviraj 2001).  When civil society as idea enters academic 
analyses of African politics it does contain the hegemonic influence of Western thought, but it 
also introduces a language in which the question of how to form the social basis for a new 
political authority can be formulated and debated.  It is this quality of civil society as idea that 
explains why the debates about civil society in Africa remain inconclusive.  Chapter Three 
examines how civil society as idea is used within the literature on Africa and illustrates how this 
idea is both a terrain for ideological struggles as well as a metaphor for social change. 
Not only did ‘civil society’ in its various Western theoretical guises enter African 
political studies through academics, but it also entered the common parlance of social 
organizations and African citizens.  How was this idea transferred from ‘expert’ knowledge to 
‘lay’ knowledge?  The permeability of these two spheres of knowledge is integral to the study of 
both civil society as idea and the interaction between idea and process, and thus this issue 
deserves further attention. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS92    Page 10 
 
Pursuits in social science differ from those of natural science in fundamental ways that 
have consequences for claims of knowledge and truth and for the application of social theory for 
practical purposes.  First, social science differs from natural science in that understanding social 
processes in order to intervene and manipulate them does not produce generalizable laws.  
Universal laws of social action cannot exist because social actors are constantly reflexively 
incorporating new knowledge into their practices, which may include knowledge of such laws 
(Giddens 1977).  The unstable nature of social ‘laws’ makes universal descriptions based on the 
predictability of social conduct and its institutional forms almost impossible, thus challenging 
descriptions of what civil society is, what it does and what it can do.   
Second, this subject-subject relationship that characterizes social science explains why 
civil society as idea does not remain located in the sphere of ‘expert’ knowledge, but can become 
part of ‘lay’ knowledge (Giddens 1977).  The incorporation and usage of ‘civil society’ at the 
local, national and international levels of public discourse constitute a phenomenon witnessed in 
both Western and African societies.  It is through this process of incorporating expert knowledge 
into lay knowledge that the rationalization of action becomes possible.  Reflexivity on the part of 
social actors has significant consequences.  For instance, the consciousness of ‘civil society’ in 
Ghana is a result of social actors employing the idea of civil society to legitimize their opinions 
and demands.  These processes are illustrated in the case of Ghana in Chapters Three and Five.   
If the purpose of theory is not to understand political processes in order to influence 
them, then what is its purpose?  It is argued that the usefulness of political analysis lies in its 
concern with ‘unacknowledged action’: the formalization of the rules and resources used 
implicitly by actors; the identification of unconscious or repressed motivational elements of 
action; and the analysis of discrepancies between intended and unintended consequences 
(Giddens 1977: 11).  This thesis attempts to illuminate the ‘unacknowledged action’ resulting 
from the extrapolation of Western notions of civil society to African societies, the application of 
this civil society theory for practical purposes by both donor agencies and international NGOs, 
and the response of local actors in Ghana to the importation of civil society as idea.   
 
2.1  Civil Society as Process 
The colonial project of ‘knowledge as power’ and the projects of the 1960s based on 
grand theories of social and economic development intentionally or unintentionally suppressed 
alternative truths and the possibility of multiple histories by imagining Western history as World 
history (Rudolph et al. 1995).   The legacy of those projects has included the creation of a 
“culturally narcissistic mirror for the West,” where historical processes that unfolded under 
concrete conditions, such as 19
th century Europe, become the perspective from which to interpret 
subsequent social development (Rudolph et al. 1995: 28; see also Mamdani 1996: 12).   
Given this legacy, it is not surprising that the idea of civil society would be adopted in 
African political studies to explain state-society relations.  As previously mentioned, civil society 
as idea carries with it the assumptions of its past and present uses.  In this case, the assumptions 
behind the idea obfuscate reality by viewing African politics and history through the prism of 
European categories and experiences: 
The so-called civil society perspective is not merely a way of understanding state-society relationships; by 
implication, civil society ought to exist because it is a superior way of organizing state-society 
relationships, given that it is the only viable or conceivable foundation for democracy…. Apparently, like 
democracy, one has to have civil society to belong to the modern world order (Hutchful 1995: 75-6). 
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Is this ‘narcissistic mirror’ a fundamental and incorrigible flaw of Africanists?  Rudolph (1995) 
argues that only a disruption of such a perspective prepares the ground for scholars to operate as 
agents in the field of an open history.   Looking at civil society as process is intended to disrupt 
the ‘civil society perspective’: to simultaneously strip down the idea to its bare assumptions and 
to search for a new way to articulate that which exists but the idea fails to capture. 
The conceptual framework for understanding civil society as process contains several 
elements that help to articulate these existing processes.  It combines an abstract notion of state 
and civil society in a dialectical relationship with theoretical discussions specific to post-colonial 
African countries including the nature of state and society in Africa, an analysis of power, and 
organizational aspects of collective action.  This conceptual framework is not intended to be 
complete, coherent or unified, but rather it offers an example of what analytical tools one might 
employ to understand civil society as process. 
The first element of the framework theorizes the relationship between ‘the state’ and 
‘society’.  It is based on Migdal’s “state-in-society” approach, which conceptualizes state-society 
relations as a process of social groupings interacting with one another and with those whose 
actual behavior they are vying to control or influence (Migdal 2001).  Within this process, 
changes occur in the groupings themselves, their goals, and ultimately the rules they are 
promoting.  The state is just like any other organization in that it is constructed and reconstructed 
through its interaction as a whole, and of its parts, with others.  International forces feature into 
this approach, since changes at the national level must also be understood in terms of the impact 
on state and society of other states and the global economy. 
This state-in-society approach provides the foundation for the theorization of a state-civil 
society dialectical relationship, in which strategies of the state and changes in those strategies 
shape civil society, and vice versa.  As a result, who comprises civil society and the types of 
alliances formed among social groups change over time.  The term ‘dialectical’ emphasizes that 
one shapes the other in a simultaneous and continuous process of constant action and reaction, 
even within the unequal power relations between the post-colonial state and society in Africa.  
The most important implication of this dialectical relationship is that the process of state and 
civil society formation and transformation cannot be grasped by isolating, observing and 
analyzing one component or the other, but requires the study of both.  There is no linear 
evolution for state or civil society.  Although their descriptions differ slightly, this state-civil 
society dialectical relationship resonates with elements in theories offered by other authors (for 
Ghana, see Hutchful 2002: 202-204; in general, see Markovitz 1998; Migdal 2001).   
The historical processes which have shaped the particular nature of African states and 
societies comprise the second element of the framework.  To grasp major shifts in the history of 
the relationship between civil society and the state, one needs to move away from the assumption 
of a single moment and identify different and even contradictory moments in this history.  
Mamdani (1996) offers a basic outline containing four historical moments in the development of 
civil society.  The first moment consists of the colonial state as the protector of colonial settlers 
and their interests as well as the political and economic interests of the colonial power.  A shift in 
the relation between the state and civil society is set in motion with the postwar colonial reforms, 
culminating in the nationalist struggle.  This struggle, led by those who were not subjects of 
customary law but not equal rights-bearing citizens for entry into civil society, produced an 
indigenous civil society, signifying the second moment.  The acquisition of control over the state 
by African leaders constitutes the third moment, at which time citizenship is granted theoretically 
to all members of society.  The fourth moment involves the absorption of the indigenous civil 
society into political society: QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS92    Page 12 
 
…a moment of the marriage between technicism and nationalism, of the proliferation of state nationalism 
in a context where the claims of the state—both developmentalist and equalizing—had a powerful 
resonance….It is the time when civil society-based social movements became demobilized and political 
movements statized (Mamdani 1996: 21).   
 
This outline will be adapted and expanded in Chapters Four to reveal the details of such 
‘moments’ in the case of Ghana. 
Adding a state perspective to Mamdani’s society-centered approach produces a more 
complete depiction of the nature of state and society in Africa.  Nationalist struggles lent 
confidence about the important role that centralized mobilizing politics could play in these 
countries after independence (Migdal 2001: 41-9).  The new political leaders of Africa came to 
believe in their states’ potential to shape their societies: to move their economies from 
agriculture to industry, to create a skilled workforce, and to induce the population to abandon 
outmoded beliefs.  The organization of the state became the focal point for state leaders to 
achieve a new unified social order.  Major changes occurred in the distribution of social control 
as those running, or seeking to run, the state organization fought to provide the predominant, 
often exclusive, set of rules.  However, this attempt has not been totally successful, as state 
leaders have faced tremendous obstacles in their efforts to assert social control and as leaders of 
other social organizations have been unwilling to relinquish their prerogatives without a struggle. 
Politics is about power, and power is minimally about the balance between control and 
consent that governs the relation between the ruler and ruled (Chabal 1992).  Examining politics 
requires knowledge of relations of power in their historical settings, and thus forms part of the 
conceptual framework for civil society as process.  It is useful to look at the post-colonial nation-
state as an imagined political community, and its creation in terms of ruptures and continuities 
with its antecedents (Chabal 1992: 39-45).  Colonization introduced a new notion of political 
community that was superimposed over existing ones, devising the categories through which 
individuals and communities were to be defined.   
The nationalists fashioned a view of the African community that was consonant with 
their opposition to colonial rule and with their desire for self-government: 
What was peculiar to post-colonial Africa was not that the nation-state was imagined by the nationalists.  
All nation-states have to be constructed through imaginative labour.  What marked Africa from most 
European states is that the state preceded the nation.  This had profound consequences for the genesis as 
well as for the new political community (Chabal 1992: 47). 
 
Nationalists attempted to create a modern political community through a process of devising a 
national vision, creating a nationalist organization, and aggregating local support for the 
nationalist project.  However, national unity was constructed on the weak foundations of colonial 
unity, allowing its legitimacy to be challenged (52).  Meanings of political community are not 
static, and interpretations of political communities as they are reinvented may reveal much about 
continuities and changes in African politics.  
The concept of political accountability is directly related to the concept of political 
community.  Political accountability defines the political arena within which ‘the rulers’ seek to 
maintain, and ‘the ruled’ seek to combat, the relations of inequality and coercion which all power 
relations entail (Chabal 1992: 54-5).  The analysis of political accountability is therefore an 
analysis of the constantly changing determinants of the theory and practice of political obligation 
between those who hold power and those who do not.  Colonial governments were never 
accountable to those over whom they ruled.  The political processes through which nationalist 
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accountability.  Nationalists assumed that the forms of political accountability created during the 
nationalist campaign and formal decolonization would apply to the independent nation-state: 
nationalists were accountable to the people insofar as the people supported their struggle for 
independence (61).  A new principle of accountability was needed, but it could only be invented 
in the practice of post-colonial politics. 
The final element of the conceptual framework for understanding civil society as process 
combines an abstract theory of collective action with more explicit arguments concerning the 
implications of organizational capabilities of social groups.  To reiterate previous arguments 
about political community and accountability, the hegemonic imperative underlying the ideology 
of national unity drives the state and the self-proclaimed dominant social groups to seek control 
and to shape civil society (Bayart 1986).  Most regimes severely restricted access to the political 
system by preventing autonomous and pluralistic organization of social groups, and instead 
either attempted to integrate various social forces into single movements or set up intermediary 
and indirect means of control.  Within this context, Bayart (1986) argues that civil society 
requires the ‘organizational principle’.   
Bayart’s organizational principle, as interpreted here, indicates that organization requires 
consciousness, consciousness requires a common cultural frame of reference, and the common 
cultural frame of reference must not be identified with the state.  Bayart (1986: 117) expresses 
uncertainty about the political possibility (and the demographic, economic or technological 
possibilities) of overcoming the discontinuities in cultural frames of reference.  Ultimately, the 
success of civil society depends on its capacity to confront the state with appropriate conceptual 
weapons.  Just as nationalism was the politics of the colonial society couched in terms of the 
colonial state, so the post-colonial society must conduct its politics in the language and actions of 
the post-colonial state if it is to contend for its ideal balance of shared power between the ruler 
and ruled.   
For Bayart (1986), this conceptual challenge may only be accomplished through 
ideological and institutional ‘mediations’ that provide for the reconstruction of identity.  Even 
then, he questions the intrinsic qualities of social movements: will they lead to more ‘equal’ 
relations between state and society?  Challenges to the state’s monopoly on power may contain 
within itself the elaboration of a new monopoly of social control by the new state leaders.  
Alternatively, if there is no monopoly over the counter-hegemonic project (or if it is eroded), the 
potential advance of civil society’s conceptual challenge to the status quo may be checked or 
may lead to the implosion of the political system as a result of a scramble for power (Bayart 
1986: 120).  In all of these scenarios, one thing is clear: there is no teleological virtue in the 
notion of civil society. 
Akwetey’s analysis of the organizing potential of social groups complements Bayart’s 
organizational principle and provides a more optimistic view of this potential.  Alongside the 
process of ‘statisation’ that typically occurred under one-party and military regimes, individuals 
and groups from different socio-economic backgrounds forged links around issues of the 
economy and the nature of the polity, leading to the emergence of occupational identities and 
horizontal affinities (Akwetey 1994).2   Such groups included trade unions, student 
organizations, women’s groups devoted to gender issues, professional and occupational bodies, 
farmers’ organizations, peasants’ cooperatives, and employers’ associations.  The effects of 
                                                  
2 Statisation is defined as the incorporation of all major civic and interest organizations into the nationalist party or 
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economic crises produced varying responses from these social groups and acted as a backdrop 
against which power struggles between state and civil society occurred: 
The economic and socio-political conditions, upon which the post-colonial framework thrived, have 
changed and new challenges to the old ways of regulating the activities and demands of organized social 
groups have emerged (Akwetey 1994: 115). 
 
Without a certain measure of organizational capability, individuals and social groups 
cannot participate in that counter-hegemonic project to challenge state power.  Akwetey (1994) 
emphasizes the organizational capabilities of social groups whose support is vital to the 
implementation of government policies.  When such groups enhance their organizational 
capabilities, they also acquire expectations challenging the existing institutional framework that 
regulates their relations to the state.  Some social forces in Ghana have been able to enhance their 
organizational capabilities, and these developments have enabled them to seek changes in their 
relations with the post-colonial state.  Political change thus involves a process of transforming 
the post-colonial political institutions by incorporating a new definition of the state-civil society 
relationship.   
 
2.2  Summary 
 
This chapter has argued that a single, structural entity called ‘civil society’ does not exist.  
Instead, the concept of ‘civil society’ can be separated into civil society as idea and civil society 
as process.  Civil society as idea provides a means to an end.  The idea has historically been a 
discursive tool employed to articulate visions of a better society.  As Chapter Three will 
demonstrate, the usage of ‘civil society’ in the literature on Africa does not escape this tradition.  
Perhaps due to its instrumental use, the idea of civil society tends to present unity where disunity 
actually exists.  In this way, the idea obscures reality through its collective misrepresentation of 
it.  Importantly, this idea is not limited to intellectual discourse, as the language of academics can 
become the language of ordinary people.  Insomuch that it does and people reflexively 
incorporate it into their actions, a single generalizable theory of civil society becomes impossible 
and the ability of the idea to affect reality becomes possible. 
In contrast, civil society as process uncovers the disunity that the idea conceals, a disunity 
that makes civil society a field of struggle between social forces.  Furthermore, civil society as 
process is historically grounded.   These qualities of civil society are captured in the framework 
which combines the state-civil society dialectical relationship, the nature of African states and 
societies, an analysis of power based on notions of political community and accountability, and 
the theoretical implications of organizational capabilities within society.  These frameworks for 
civil society as idea and as process form the basis of the analyses contained in the remaining 
chapters.  In the next chapter, the discussion turns specifically to civil society as idea and its 









Convergence on Civil Society as Idea 
 
 
The idea of civil society has an important presence in the world; increasing numbers of people presume the 
possibility of civil society; the very fact that they do and act accordingly gives it real force (Comaroff and 
Comaroff 1999: 24). 
 
This chapter focuses on the various ways that different types of social actors articulate 
civil society as idea and the means they employ in such an articulation.  Chapter Two 
demonstrated that the idea of civil society has always been the subject of normative theorizing.  
As will be seen shortly, such theorizing becomes a normative battleground in contemporary 
African studies, as scholars from all backgrounds push forth their conceptions of civil society 
based on ideological positions and notions of rightness.  This chapter also shows how the ideas 
of scholars become the strategies of donors.  Finally, it examines how links between academics 
and the ‘development profession’ allow civil society as idea to enter Ghanaian society, and the 
reaction of local actors to this idea.  
 
3.1  Civil Society as Idea in the Literature 
 
In the late 1980s, the theme of a state-society struggle reverberated through Africanist 
circles in North America and became the new prismatic lens through which to gauge the 
significance of events in Africa (Mamdani 1996: 14).  Many Africanist accounts of civil society, 
as well as those of African scholars, seem to combine analysis with prescription, description with 
advocacy.  The perspectives found in the literature on civil society in Africa can broadly be 
divided into the ‘conventional view’, as the dominant discourse, and alternative perspectives, 
which include Democratic Socialist, Marxist and Emancipatory viewpoints as well as critiques of 
civil society as a ‘liberal project’.   The following literature review discloses the assumptions 
embedded in these various perspectives. 
3.1.1  The Conventional View of Civil Society and Alternative Perspectives 
 
In an analysis of works on civil society by Chazan (1992), Diamond (1994), Schmitter 
(1997) and Hadenius and Uggla (1997), a common conception of civil society appears which 
Kasfir (1998a) calls the ‘conventional view’.  The conventional view limits ‘civil society’ to 
specific kinds of non-state organizations in public life engaged in organizational activity 
according to particular criteria, and it perceives ‘civil society’ as an instrument to make states 
more democratic, more transparent and more accountable.  Chazan applies this view of civil 
society to the African context.  A full understanding of the meaning and implications of the 
conventional view requires an elaboration of this African context. 
Because existing social formations have forced little change in authoritarian states, and in 
most cases either acquiesced in their rule or actively supported them, academic proponents of 
democratic change in Africa must look elsewhere to explain the surge towards democracy in the 
1990s and how it could be sustained (Kasfir 1998a).  Organizations that seem worthy opponents 
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independent from the state, sufficiently financed and expertly led, in order to overcome 
opposition to democracy and participate in its consolidation.  Most, but not all, are new and 
frequently organized in opposition to specific practices of the existing regime.   
Employed to accomplish the authors’ objective of better governance in African countries, 
this narrow conception precariously separates organizations constituting ‘civil society’ from the 
social bases of the society whose government they purport to reform: 
If these organiza tions must meet multiple organisational and social criteria to qualify for membership in 
civil society, they are less likely to represent social interests that are deeply and widely shared by groups 
within the society (Kasfir 1998a: 6). 
 
The conventional view claims that recent openings in political space for voluntary associations 
originate from a political and economic weakening of the African state and that this space allows 
for the creation and expansion of civil society.  However, the continuing importance of patronage 
in maintaining African governments challenges this depiction of state-society relations, and the 
absence of a vigorous economy makes it unlikely that ‘civil society’ organizations can remain 
autonomous from the state unless they are funded by foreign donors (Kasfir 1998a: 9).  
Additionally, the quality of ‘civility’ attributed to civil society within the conventional view 
obscures the deep political and economic cleavages that must be resolved before members of a 
society are able to work with each other within a democratic system.   
The conventional view does not consider empirical questions, but rather its proponents 
settle for a concept that presumes the feasibility of establishing the ideas they would wish on 
Africa (Kasfir 1998a: 10).   Proponents seem to prefer solutions of ‘good governance’ to 
addressing more complex problems of working towards political settlements, and the idea of 
‘civil society’ provides “an easy alternative to the partisan political battles that so many regard as 
incapable of resolving those problems” (Foley and Edwards quoted in Kasfir 1998a: 12). Such 
notions of governance and civil society attempt to remove politics from the equation, but what 
kind of democracy can a non-political civil society achieve?    
Alternative perspectives to the conventional view flow from various sources.  A summary 
of these perspectives follow, but note that it is based on a sample of texts and does not purport to 
be all-encompassing or to capture every nuance.  First, the Social Democrat perspective of civil 
society envisions a democracy based on fundamental changes in the distribution of power.  
Defining socialism as a synonym for a ‘greater democracy’, Post (1991) argues that the building 
of socialism requires a single socialist party that institutionalizes pluralism and opposition within 
the party.  He emphasizes the role of civil society in building this ‘socialism’: “the essential 
preconditions for democracy are established by the nature and level of organization in civil 
society and the ways in which these conditions impinge on the state” (36).  Another Social 
Democrat, Sachikonye (1995) insists that political parties and state institutions cannot 
exclusively guarantee that sections of society are represented and have opportunities to improve 
their material well-being, and thus civil society institutions can play a key role in articulating the 
interests of under-represented sections of society. 
Second, the Marxist perspective holds that the nature and structure of civil society 
necessarily arises from class relations in society (see Markovitz 1998; Nzimande and Sikhosana 
1995; Wood 1990).  Proponents of this perspective criticize the conventional view for its failure 
to acknowledge this class element:  
A compulsive concentration on civil society, improperly understood, will distract from those elements of 
coercion in capitalism that invariably affect most Africans.  ‘Exploitation’ and ‘domination’ are old words, 
out of fashion.  They are, however, still relevant (Markovitz 1998: 47). 
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The civil society framework is perceived to conceptualize away the problem of capitalism by 
“disaggregating society into fragments, with no over-arching power structure, no totalizing unity, 
no systematic coercions” (Wood 1990: 65).  Furthermore, arguments for ‘autonomous civil 
society’ ignore the entire Marxist critique of liberal, ‘bourgeois’ democracy.    
A third perspective comes from an Emancipatory viewpoint, authors who imagine a 
democracy without parties but conducted through political organizations (see Mohan 1998; 
Wamba-dia-Wamba 1994).  These ‘political organizations’ are not seen as mass organizations, 
social movements or civil society, but as multiple sites to channel people’s opinions within the 
context of a new progressive politics.  The key is alliance building between these organizations 
at various local political sites such as factories and villages.  In the short term, the state sets the 
rules in which this popular and progressive democracy can function: 
In the longer term, alliances may form which can lead to a ‘reconstitution of state-civil society relations and 
not one but many, depending on concrete experiences and openings’ (Mohan 1998: 19). 
 
The final alternative perspective arises from a broader analysis of the ‘civil society versus 
the state’ paradigm.   From one direction, the paradigm is criticized for its evolutionist theory of 
history conceived in the categorization of traditional versus modern (Mamdani 1995).  The civil 
society-state paradigm implies a certain historical trajectory for African countries in which the 
traditional community becomes a modern civil society.  From another direction, the civil society-
state paradigm is criticized as part of the ‘liberal project’: 
The significant theses associated with the concept [of civil society] appear not to be derived from a body of 
empirical evidence and well-constructed theory but from a set of neo-liberal nostrums, incorporated into the 
argument as assumptions and then proudly presented as valid conclusions.  As such, civil society forms part 
of the ‘liberal project’… (Allen 1997: 336). 
  
Western governments, their associated agencies, and international financial institutions need a 
‘civil society’ that will marginalize groups whose modes of existence and values are not 
compatible with liberal democracy (Allen 1997; see also Beckman 1993; Mustapha 1998).  
These two strands of critique reveal the assumption embodied within the state-civil society 
paradigm, and the conventional view of civil society, of an evolutionist history in which all 
things ‘traditional’ must pass into modernity.   
From the discussion above, it is possible to draw out three tendencies in the usage of 
‘civil society’: the hegemonic, the counter-hegemonic, and the tactical.  The hegemonic tendency 
is illustrated not only by the conventional view, but also by the attention and importance that the 
concept has captured in Africanist circles.  However, an equally strong counter-hegemonic 
tendency exists, as a result of either ideology or academic caution, which challenges the 
usefulness of this concept as a lens through which to interpret state-society relations or to 
envisage notions of democracy.  The tactical tendency overlaps the hegemonic and the counter-
hegemonic, in that it refers to the employment of civil society as idea to achieve an objective 
other than explaining social phenomenon.  It is here, in the blurred boundaries between these 
three tendencies, where the normative malleability of civil society as idea is located.  Before 
elaborating further on this theme, it is important to show how these tendencies play out in the 
usage of ‘civil society’ by Ghanaian academics.   
The ways in which several Ghanaian academics employ ‘civil society’ to analyze 
Ghanaian politics demonstrate the hegemonic tendency.  For example, Drah (1996) supports a 
Tocquevillian conception of civil society that emphasizes the significance of a variety of 
voluntary associations for the emergence and consolidation of democracy, because the free 
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also explains Ghanaian politics in terms of civil society, but in contrast to Drah’s thesis of civil 
society facilitating democratization, Ninsin warns against regarding civil societies as universal 
agents of democratization.  As will be seen in Chapter Four, he depicts the struggle for 
democracy during 1989-92 as one between a ‘prodemocracy civil society’ and an ‘alternative 
civil society.  His juxtaposition of these two civil societies, which contradicts most theoretical 
discussions linking civil society and democracy, reveals the hegemony of the idea of civil 
society. 
The work of Gyimah-Boadi illustrates both the hegemonic and tactical tendencies (see 
Gyimah-Boadi 1994, 1996, 1998; Gyimah-Boadi and Oquaye 2000). Adopting the conventional 
view of civil society, he argues that civil associations have existed and flourished in post-
colonial Ghana, but their contribution to the construction of a viable civil society has been 
restricted because they have been dependent upon the capabilities and predilections of the state 
and various regimes.  He consistently suggests that democracy in Ghana, and Africa in general, 
needs a more independent and autonomous civil society and that the ‘construction’ of such as 
civil society requires foreign support.  In contrast, Hutchful (1995, 2002) exhibits a counter-
hegemonic tendency in his theoretical expositions on the meaning and usage of ‘civil society’ 
and in his general analyses of Ghanaian and African politics: 
The use of the concept of civil society is thus an attempt to capture the fact that something significant has 
happened in African politics.  But what? And are civil society and democracy accurate depictions of what 
has transpired? (Hutchful 1995: 58).   
 
3.1.2  Resolving the Unresolvable 
 
In addition to identifying these three tendencies encompassed in the various perspectives 
of civil society as idea, this literature review of civil society in Africa also evinces how authors’ 
conceptions of civil society are linked to their understanding of democracy.  This linkage reveals 
one explanation for the popularity of ‘civil society’.  Its frequent appearance in texts results from 
a convergence on civil society as idea from authors with intellectual dispositions to the Right and 
the Left.  Those on the Left, the Social Democrats more than the Marxists, disenchanted with the 
state as a result of the defeat of Socialist projects after the fall of the Berlin wall, look towards 
‘civil society’ to build a new ‘Socialist’ democracy.  Those more on the Right, proponents of the 
conventional view, acknowledging the foundering of initial attempts at multiparty, constitutional 
democracy, seek ‘civil society’ as the missing element that liberal democracy in Africa requires. 
Convergence appears through the common usage of ‘civil society’, but it may have 
deeper roots in notions of popular democratic participation and desires for ‘meaningful’ 
democracy.  If this literature review is expanded to include general works on democracy in 
Africa, this argument about convergence still holds.  For example, take a selection of works on 
democracy by the following well-known scholars: Ake (1993, 1994), Chazan (1999), Olukoshi 
(1998), Szeftel (1999), Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1988).  All of these authors refer to the 
importance of ‘civil society’ in the process of democratization or consolidating democracy.  
Beckman (1993) also recognizes this pattern when he points out that ‘radical democrats’ and 
‘neo-liberals’ have common interests in the ‘liberation of civil society’.  Notions of popular 
struggle, of creating democratic space, of reliance on society to change the state, and of struggle 
and organization within society appear throughout the literature on civil society and democracy 
in Africa.  Perhaps this convergence on civil society as idea expresses the shared conception of 
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Civil society as idea may be a common concept on which diverse ideological 
perspectives draw, but their goals still differ relative to their ideologies.   In the intellectual 
pursuit of understanding political processes in Africa, their underlying objective is ultimately to 
influence those processes to achieve some goal.  ‘Civil society’ is the current focus of this 
pursuit, as history has demonstrated the failure of other conceptual devices such as the state and 
the market.  If one can understand how ‘civil society’ works to shape the rules of the political 
game which constitute the relations between state and society, then one can attempt to influence 
rule making.  Liberal proponents of the conventional view intend to push for political and 
economic liberalization by supporting an entrepreneurial middle class.  Social Democrats and the 
Emancipatory visionaries hope to create informal institutions for participation by the masses 
through constructing new, multiple sites of politics.  Marxists do not need civil society to achieve 
their goal, so they can dismiss the concept altogether by criticizing its tendency to conceal class 
relations.  Only the rare intellectual sees no use in talking about civil society.   
In conclusion, what ‘civil society’ is often depends on what ‘democracy’ is.  If the latter 
is an essentially contested idea, then the former must also be.  However, in the process of 
contesting its meaning, reality becomes blurred as the idea of civil society becomes more a 
metaphor for social change and less useful to understand what is actually happening. 
 
3.2  Scholars, Donors and Donor agendas 
 
The idea of civil society has influenced donor discourses and the objectives of their aid to 
African countries.  As will be seen shortly, donors adopting the conventional view of civil 
society support broad intervention to create a ‘civil society’ that will support political and 
economic liberalization.  In the process of operationalizing this view, theory is altered to meet 
the necessities of practice and practice has political implications.  The following discussion 
outlines this movement from theory to practice to politics. 
 
3.2.1  Operationalizing Theory  
 
Civil society as idea has embedded itself in the ‘development profession’.  The 
community of scholars, consultants and activists that influence the policy of national 
governments, donor agencies and international NGOs has constructed an elaborate discourse 
around ‘civil society’ and its ‘role’ in the process of social, economic and political change in 
‘developing’ countries.  Because this community influences foreign-aid priorities, it represents 
“a common locus for both the reception of the idea of civil society and its retransmission to aid-
recipient countries” (Jenkins 2001: 250).  Foreign aid agencies may constitute just another 
culture that has fashioned its version of civil society to suit its purposes, but with the crucial 
difference that they deploy considerable economic and political resources to bring about change 
(251).  As we shall see in the case of Ghana, the resulting unequal power relations have 
important consequences. 
During the latter part of the 1980s, multilateral and bilateral donors adopted the strategy 
that political reforms should accompany economic reforms.
3  According to Farrington, this shift 
represents donors’ acknowledgment that “the models of development they wished to foster 
would not be consolidated unless effective demand for them could be articulated by the relevant 
                                                  
3 Drawing heavily on the works contained in Hyden (1992), this shift in strategy became know in the 1989 World 
Bank report Sub-Saharan Africa: from Crisis to Sustainable Growth, which characterized the crisis in Africa as a 
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sections of the society” (quoted in Gary 1996: 152).  For example, the World Bank adopted the 
idea of ‘civil society’ in order to build constituencies for the economic and political reforms it 
supports: 
The Bank’s promotion of civil society is linked to its promotion of accountability, legitimacy, transparency 
and participation as it is these factors which empower civil society and reduce the power of the state.  
Accountability is crucial to ensure congruence between public policy and actual implementation, and the 
efficient allocation and use of public resources (Williams and Young 1994: 87). 
 
Following this reasoning, the World Bank supports a ‘civil society’ composed of contractual, 
non-community, non-affective groups that will accept, even demand, the Bank’s reform 
programs (Williams and Young 1994).   This requirement that civil society be compatible with 
modernization reflects elements in the conventional view. 
Adopting similar logic, aid agencies of advanced capitalist countries have also identified 
‘civil society’ as the key element in promoting ‘democratic development’ in Africa.  Bilateral 
donors perceive ‘civil society’ simultaneously as autonomous centers of social and economic 
power, as an arena of public space, and as a set of private actors.  Thus, foreign aid intends to 
support both individual organizations and the political environment in which they carry out their 
functions (Jenkins 2001: 253).  For example, a 1996 report of the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) states:
4  
The art and craft of the democracy strategist, then, lies in building and supporting coalitions of associations 
that are proreform at a particular historical moment in the democratic path (quoted in Kasfir 1998b: 133). 
 
Additionally, donors are attracted to the idea of supporting local non-partisan NGOs whose 
purposes are to promote public interests that are new to African polities and for which a domestic 
constituency does not exist (Kasfir 1998b).   
It appears that donor agencies have created civil society in their own image (Jenkins 
2001).  Donor discourses often incorporate ‘civil society’ as a political ombudsman and 
‘governance’ as a euphemism for ‘politics’, underplaying the contingencies which influence the 
formation of opposition movements, the entrenchment of political order and the exercise of 
power (Jenkins 2001: 268).  Symbolizing the values of impartiality, fair play, and commitment to 
public welfare, ‘civil society’ is cast in a role similar to the one which donor agencies see 
themselves playing in relation to the countries to which they give aid.  Their idea of civil society 
involves not only its depoliticization, but also its bureaucratization.  The cogency of civil society 
as idea among donors and its consequent effect on their objectives and actions becomes clear in 
the case of Ghana.  Donors use aid to embed political and economic liberalism in Ghanaian 
society through programs claiming to support ‘civil society’.   
As Chapter Four will show, Ghana’s political history is checkered with military coups 
and authoritarian regimes.  Ghana’s most recent attempt at multiparty democracy began in 1992 
with presidential and parliamentary elections.  The international donor community went to great 
lengths to secure this transition to democracy (Boafo-Arthur 1998).  However, opposition parties 
perceived the presidential outcome as rigged and boycotted the parliamentary elections.  Against 
this background, donor ‘democracy’ assistance between 1993-96 concentrated on ensuring a 
‘free and fair’ process in the 1996 elections.  Only in 1997 did donor aid begin to include ‘civil 
society’ assistance (Hearn 1998).  
                                                  
4 Gary Hansen, ‘Constituencies for Reform: Strategic Approaches for Donor-Supported Civic Advocacy Programs’, 
Assessment Report No. 12, Center for Development Information and Evaluation, USAID, February 1996 
 QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS92    Page 21 
 
Who and what is civil society in Ghana?  In general, donor references to ‘civil society’ 
allude to a narrow section of society.  Foreign assistance to ‘civil society’ aims to strengthen a 
new African elite committed to the promotion of a limited form of procedural democracy and 
structural-adjustment type economic policies in partnership with the West, as well as to the 
strategic position of civil society in relation to the state (Hearn 1999).  To achieve these goals, 
donors support efforts to bring ‘representatives of civil society’ together with government 
officials in forums to discuss national economic policy (Hearn 1999: 6).  Examples of two such 
forums include the USAID-sponsored National Economic Forum held in 1997 and the World 
Bank-sponsored Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI).
5  Donors also 
support ‘civil society’ through funding programs that provide material and organizational 
resources to individual organizations, particularly for research, parliamentary lobbying, public 
education campaigns and entrepreneurial initiatives.  The most popular recipients of ‘democracy’ 
assistance were formal, urban-based, professional NGOs (5).   
Ghana is the World Bank’s largest program in Africa.  Between 1992 and 1995, the 
World Bank provided one third of the country’s total aid (Hearn 1999: 12).  Since Wolfensohn 
became president in 1995, the Bank has increased its involvement in the non-governmental 
sector.  The Bank has promoted interaction with ‘civil society’ in three ways.  First, its Country 
Assistance Strategy report developed collaboratively with the government recently elicited the 
opinions of local organizations.  Second, the Bank employs NGO liaison officers (now called 
Social Development officers).  Third, it participated in the SAPRI exercise.  As will be seen in 
Chapter Five, SAPRI was a public initiative in which the Bank discussed issues relating to 
national economic policy with ‘representatives of civil society’.  These semi-institutionalized 
means of dealing with ‘civil society’ indicate the extent to which the World Bank has 
incorporated the term ‘civil society’ in its policies, programs and the discourse attached to them.  
The United States and Germany provide the largest sources of assistance to ‘civil society 
organizations’ followed by the Nordic countries, the Netherlands and Canada (Hearn 1999).  
However, no other donor agency uses the civil society theoretical framework as a basis of its aid 
work to the extent that USAID does (Hearn 1999: 7).  Germany provides substantial 
‘democracy’ assistance through its political foundations.  For example, the Friedrich Ebert 
Foundation works with educated, urban-based NGOs, such as the International Federation of 
Women Lawyers and the Ghana Journalists Associations, and the Friedrich Naumann 
Foundation supports institutions directly promoting a liberal economic agenda, such as the 
Institute for Economic Affairs and the Association of Ghana Industries.  Britain explicitly 
promotes ‘good government’ through public sector reforms and Sweden emphasizes human 
rights.  Denmark, the Netherlands and Canada also have significant aid programs but the focus of 
their aid is never explicitly ‘civil society’.   
The nature of USAID programs in Ghana may reflect the extent to which the US is home 
to the hegemonic tendency within the civil society literature on Africa, and the degree to which 
USAID has drawn on these scholars to guide its programs.  Leading Africanists in the US have 
first theorized ‘civil society’ and then tried to influence it (Hearn 1999: footnote 9).  For 
example, Harbeson was the regional democracy adviser for Eastern and Southern Africa in 
USAID during the mid-1990s.
6  Another example involves the National Endowment for 
Democracy (NED), established in 1983 to work in conjunction with USAID.  Diamond, cited 
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above in the literature review, is co-director of NED’s research center, the International Forum 
for Democratic Studies, and co-editor of NED’s Journal of Democracy.  
Having suggested some reasons why the US emphasizes ‘civil society’ in its foreign aid 
programs, the discussion turns to a closer analysis of its assistance strategy.  After the 1992 and 
1996 elections, Rawlings, who had overthrown the government in 1981, remained at the head of 
government and the National Democratic Congress, the former regime in a political party 
disguise, became the ruling party.  Against this backdrop, USAID assistance attempted to 
facilitate the consolidation of democracy according to a civil society theory apparently adapted 
from academics such as Diamond and Harbeson.  Hearn summarizes the theoretical framework 
underpinning USAID assistance as follows: 
A thriving civil society can widen democracy by promoting pluralism, and it can deepen democracy by 
embedding the values and institutions of liberal democracy within society at large, not simply at the state 
level (1999: 16). 
 
Hearn’s reading of USAID documents concludes that USAID parlance depicts ‘civil society’ as 
an arena of confrontation between organizations loyal to the government and ‘democratic’ 
organizations (often donor-funded), in which there will be winners and losers.  At that time, 
USAID perceived ‘civil society’ to be dominated by government-sponsored organizations, and 
therefore concentrated its programs on assisting organizations corresponding to its theory of civil 
society in an effort to promote its vision of liberal democracy (Hearn 1999: 18).   
Another US-based organization working in conjunction with USAID in Ghana was the 
International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES).
7  In 1997, IFES initiated a five-year 
project, Enhancing Civil Society Effectiveness at the Local Level (ESCELL), focused on rural 
civil society and its integration with the local government structure.  Ramm commented that this 
project was seeking local, spontaneous associations—“the real civil society” (interviewed 
30/08/01).  Hearn describes ESCELL as “one of the most carefully designed and ambitious of all 
donor civil society interventions in Africa”(1999: 10).
 8   
Economic objectives are interspersed with the political objectives of USAID programs.  
Liberal economic reforms enter the discourse of ‘civil society’ when USAID labels private sector 
development programs as civil society strengthening projects, defines business associations as 
integral components of civil society, and supports think tanks and policy institutes that 
popularize economic liberalism (Hearn 1999: 23).  For example, between 1992 and 1997, NED 
gave over US$500,000 to the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) for projects promoting the role 
of private sector within Parliament and among the public.   
IEA is one of two leading neo-liberal policy institutions in Ghana, the second being the 
Center for Policy Analysis (CEPA).  Established by a World Bank-led consortium of donors, 
CEPA comprises one of over 15 think tanks across Africa intended to build up an “African cadre 
of neo-liberal economists” (Hearn 1999: 24).  These two policy institutes receive some of the 
largest donor contributions to ‘African civil society’ and would cease operating without such 
external assistance (ibid). 
It can be argued that the objectives embodied in donor assistance to ‘civil society’ 
described above, particularly those of USAID and the World Bank, are derived from the 
conventional view of civil society.  The case of Ghana verifies the influence of theory, explicit 
attempts to put it into practice, and how attempts to operationalize theory become political as 
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donors try to shape the landscape of civil society in Ghana.  Notably, the types of organizations 
donors are funding in Ghana are among the key actors in each society: 
Such groups are at the center of shaping the most important questions facing each of these countries: the 
type of economic policy to be pursued, the meaning and content of democracy, the form and power of local 
government, and the position of women in society (Hearn 1999: 24). 
 
This progression from theory to practice to politics supports the critique of civil society as a 
‘liberal project’.   
 
3.2.2  Implications of Donor-Funded ‘Civil Society’ 
 
Two major implications arise from donor-funded ‘civil society’.  First, rather than 
changing the foundations of African politics, the version of civil society that writers call for and 
that donors create may assist in stabilizing the status quo (Jenkins 2001: 134; Hearn 2000: 27).  
In the new model of development assistance, ‘civil society organizations’ are expected to work 
in ‘partnership’ with governments through consensus building around structural adjustment 
programs or monitoring the government’s implementation of its World Bank approved Poverty 
Reduction Strategy.
 9  The powerful influence of donor agencies on local organizations, 
combined with the application of civil society as idea to achieve their objectives of economic and 
political liberalization, may work towards stabilizing the existing social and political order. 
In the emerging liberal democracies of Africa, a second implication concerns the 
inadequacy of the politics of structural adjustment employed by donor agencies in dealing with 
authoritarian regimes and the shift towards a new politics of structural adjustment.  In Ghana, 
demonstrations in over the introduction of the Value-Added Tax, which ended in its withdrawal, 
convinced donors and the government that implementing difficult economic policy requires 
some consensus within society (Hearn 2000: 28).  As part of this new politics, the World Bank 
and the United States intend to create a constituency for their preferred economic and political 
reforms under the rhetoric of ‘facilitating consensus building through bringing civil society into 
the policy-making process.’  ‘Civil society’ serves as a medium for the new politics of structural 
adjustment, through which multilateral and bilateral donors can lobby governments to adopt their 
preferred economic reforms. 
This picture of the new politics of structural adjustment is not yet complete.  Critics of 
donor agencies form another set of actors on this political scene.  During much of the 1980s, 
parts of the NGO community opposed the World Bank’s structural adjustment programs.  As the 
NGO sector is not homogenous, this critical stance had multiple points of origin and contained 
diverse opinions.  In general, this criticism emerged from concerns with poverty, with the 
validity of particular development models and with unparticipatory processes of policymaking.  
Significantly, the World Bank may have adopted the civil society discourse partly in response to 
these criticisms.   
Despite their apparent opposition to each other, common elements exist in the agendas of 
the World Bank and its international NGO critics.  First, international NGOs provide a conduit of 
micro-interference at the community level that parallels the macro-interference of the World 
Bank at the national level (Williams and Young 1994).  Second, international NGOs often share 
with the Bank a tactical use of the idea of civil society by funding ‘civil society’ organizations 
                                                  
9 See Annual Report on Development Effectiveness 1999 and Annual Report on Development Effectiveness  
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and projects that further their respective objectives.  In this way, civil society as idea becomes 
the terrain of a new politics of structural adjustment in which donors agencies and international 
NGOs struggle to influence governments and local actors. 
For Hearn (2000), the solution to donor funded ‘civil society’ lies in ‘autonomous social 
forces’, but this may be an idealistic response.  Are social forces ever truly autonomous?  She 
neglects the possibility that some ‘civil society organizations’ may benefit from funding yet 
maintain a degree of autonomy, or that these social groups already existed in society and have 
been enhanced not created.  What might be a more accurate understanding is that donors, and to 
a lesser extent international NGOs, privilege some sections in African societies over others by 
providing resources previously unattainable.  Hutchful (2002) refers to this process as the 
‘hierarchy and differentiation of civil society’.  Social organizations in Ghana enter this new 
politics of structural adjustment as another set of actors, as will become apparent in Chapter 
Five, because they perceive an opportunity to further their objectives through the idea of civil 
society.  
 
3.3 Consciousness of ‘Civil Society’ in Ghana 
 
As a result of the link between academics who theorize about the phenomenon of civil 
society and donors and international NGOs who have attempted to operationalize certain strands 
of civil society theory and incorporate it into their agenda, civil society as idea pervades the 
development profession.  These links extend to multiple categories of social actors and allow this 
idea to permeate the agendas of most social organizations in Ghana and perhaps the national 
discourse.
10  The following discussion provides examples of ways in which different local actors 
and organizations define and employ ‘civil society’ and how this leads to a self-conscious ‘civil 
society’ in Ghana. 
In 1996, some occupational organizations, in collaboration with the University of Ghana 
and financed by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, organized a conference on “Civil Society in 
Ghana.”  The Foundation’s Resident Director states that “a dispassionate reflection on 
developments, challenges, problems and perspectives relating to civil society, can help in making 
the contribution of civil society to democratization and development even bigger and more 
sustainable” (Mayer 1996: xi, emphasis added).  Notably, the presentation of papers at this 
conference came from both academics and leaders of organizations with a reputable history in 
Ghanaian politics (see Drah and Oquaye 1996).  Drah presented a theoretical background of the 
civil society concept, while other papers concerned the role of different social groups or 
organizations in the ongoing process of democratization in Ghana, such as the Trade Union 
Congress, Ghana Bar Association, Ghana National Association of Teachers, youth and women. 
The significance of this conference lies in its value as an exercise in reflection and the 
identity of those doing the reflecting.  It illustrates the politicization of organizations over the 
course of history as they have struggled at various points in time to change authoritarian regimes, 
as Chapter Four will illustrate.  The expression of themselves collectively as ‘civil society’ is 
only a new method of describing a process with a much longer history.  Most of the conference 
papers included a historical narrative of the organization within Ghanaian politics, demonstrating 
consciousness of their past, present and future role in politics, only now this future role is 
perceived through the idea of civil society.   
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Such a reflection on ‘the role of civil society’ not only increases expectations among the 
participant organizations, but also accelerates the institutionalization of ‘civil society’ and the 
association of ‘civil society’ with notions of representation.  For example, editors of the 
published conference papers comment: 
[This book] contains mostly papers presented by representatives of active aspects of civil society in Ghana 
and may largely be considered a valuable practical handbook on civil society in Ghana (Drah and Oquaye 
1996, emphasis added). 
 
We return to this theme of institutionalizing ‘civil society’ at the close of the thesis, after 
exploring other ways in which this process of institutionalization may be occurring. 
Examples of a self-conscious collective identity as ‘civil society’ and definitions of the 
role such a ‘civil society’ should play are not limited to this conference, or to a narrow group of 
individuals and organizations.  Pulled from multiple sources, the following material attempts to 
show the various and sometimes contradicting ways that people in Ghanaian society define civil 
society and associate the idea with their own actions.  To start with, take this statement by the 
president of Ghana Association of Women Entrepreneurs: 
The concept of civil society is to try and complement the effort of government in the area of offering social 
services, because the civil societies get far where government cannot go, and they are so much in touch 
with the people.  I mean [NGOs] are the first contact with the people in the rural areas and same thing with 
churches (Quachey, interviewed 27/02/01). 
 
Another example is the description of civil society given by the moderator at a workshop to 
discuss issues concerning the World Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy for Ghana: 
Civil society, when effective in its work, facilitates the role of the state by helping establish public peace 
and security, create an environment for employment and g rowth, provide social services….civil society can 
be effective only when it is democratically organized and relates to the state and market structures  
(Gbedemah, “Proceedings of the Volta Region Workshop”).  
 
Compare those statements to the following comment from a staff member of The Gender Center 
in reference to internal discussions of the Network for Women’s Rights:  
…some people don’t want to have confrontation with the state and others say you have to be out there and 
very strong in criticism of the state, it’s what civil society is about and have a right to occupy that 
space…(Cusack, interviewed 16/08/01). 
 
These three examples show how civil society as idea can be associated with activities that 
support government efforts in national development or with activities that challenge the 
government’s monopoly on development and exclusion of other elements in society.  However, 
the latter is only a recent phenomenon, and the former remains the dominant impression.  
Additionally, several leaders of ‘civil society organizations’ expressed confusion over who or 
what civil society is.  Despite this confusion, ‘civil society’ forms an essential component of the 
political vocabulary utilized by organizations, government and donors of all types, facilitating 
communication among and within these sets of actors (Ramm, interviewed 30/08/01).   
A reoccurring theme within the diverse interpretations of ‘civil society’ involves the 
application of civil society as idea by individuals and organizations to understand their own 
actions within the national context.  Social actors describe themselves as ‘civil society’, and by 
that definition their actions are legitimized, or at least argued as legitimate.  The Structural 
Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI) provides an excellent example of self-
conscious ‘civil society’.  Conceived at the global level among a group of international NGOs, 
SAPRI embodies the notion of ‘civil society’ as a conceptually unified entity, juxtaposed to the 
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its launch in 1997, “What is really significant about this initiative is that it is about participation, 
it is about civil society, but it is also about civil society participation on the issue of the day, 
economic policymaking”.
11  The extensive discussion of SAPRI in Chapter Five will show that 
this initiative facilitated the transmission of civil society as idea among a wide range of 
individuals and organizations in Ghana.  One participant stated, “The SAPRI process actually 
enabled us to know or even to concretize the idea of civil society as it is so called in this country” 
(Nyoagbe, interviewed 25/09/01). 
Bringing the discussion full circle, it is interesting to close with an examination of 
another conference for ‘civil society’ addressing the theme “The Role of Civil Society in 
Assessing Public Sector Performance in Ghana” (see Mackay and Gariba 2000).  Conference 
participants included a mélange of NGOs, advocacy groups, parliamentarians and World Bank 
staff, and the objective of the conference involved brainstorming ways for ‘civil society’ to 
participate in assessing public sector performance.
12   The significant points to draw from this 
conference concern how the World Bank perceives ‘civil society’ participation and how social 
actors identified as ‘civil society’ perceive their capacity for participation.  It is clear that the 
World Bank now recognizes ‘civil society’ as an important participant in ‘development’, but in a 
role largely limited to monitoring and measuring development outcomes.
13  The conference 
proceedings reveal an emphasis by participants on questions of representation, lack of capacity to 
carry out policy analysis and the need for coordination among themselves.  Overall, an implicit 
consensus emerged that ‘civil society’ should participate in assessing public sector performance, 
but exactly who and how remained unresolved. 
Through the expansion of civil society as idea and through its use to legitimize action, a 
consciousness of a collective identity as ‘civil society’ developed among various social 
organizations in Ghana.  But as the previous discussion illuminated, this identity is fluid and ever 
changing depending on the context and actors involved.  In fact, one could distinguish between 
several types of self-consciousness: (1) an awareness that past actions can be described under a 
new label, (2) the recognition of the advantages from using this label and want to benefit from 
the international and national momentum behind ‘civil society’, and (3) conscious efforts to 
repackage previous ideological beliefs, which produce a certain connotation in society according 
to historical moments, into the more acceptable idea of civil society because of its resonance 
with the contemporary dominant ideology of political and economic liberalism. 
 
3.4   Conclusion 
 
Two themes surface in this exploration of the idea of civil society as conceived by 
multiple categories of social actors from the international to the national to the local level and 
from academics to donors to citizens.  The first theme is widespread convergence on civil society 
as idea in three ways: (1) in the literature on civil society in Africa among intellectuals spanning 
from the Left to the Right; (2) in the discourses and objectives of donor agencies and 
                                                  
11 See the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Network web page at http://www.saprin.org for the full texts 
of speeches given at the SAPRI global launch. 
12 Interestingly, parliamentarians and the Parliament as an institution are considered by the World Bank to be part of 
civil society.  See Wolfensohn (2000) and World Bank (2001).   
13 See also Wolfensohn’s speech at the SAPRI global launch. 
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international NGOs; and (3) in the way different social organizations use the idea of civil society 
to achieve their objectives and to create a collective identity.   
A second theme running through this chapter concerns the positive and negative 
implications of civil society as idea: 
Insofar as it must, by its very nature, establish limits, it will always negate, exclude, silence, erase, rule out.  
On the other hand, its positive dimension lies in its capacity to open up spaces of democratizing 
aspiration…to mandate practical experimentation in the building of new publics, new modes of association, 
new media expression, new sorts of moral community, new politics (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999: 33).   
 
The capacity to exclude and silence emanate mostly from the unequal power relations that are at 
work when donor agencies, the government and social organizations engage each other through 
the common discourse of civil society and when resources are selectively distributed through the 
funding of certain organizations.  However, civil society as idea also provides those on the 
unequal side of the power balance with more leverage and tools with which to engage in the 
struggle over the power balance itself.  As we shall see again in Chapter Five, civil society as 
idea legitimizes actions, and such actions may produce political openings for ‘civil society’ to 
further participate in national decision-making.   
To conclude, civil society as idea is polymorphous.  It can assume the role assigned to it 
by intellectuals, donor agencies, and Ghanaian social organizations.  While embodying diverse 
meanings and employed in the pursuit of various objectives, the consistent feature of civil 
society as idea has been its ability to express visions of social change and legitimize actions 
taken in the name of social change.  By the 1990s civil society as idea is the idiom through which 
to articulate and understand political processes in Ghana that have previously been described in 
terms of class or ideological cleavages.  The next chapter furthers this attempt to deconstruct 
civil society as idea by examining Ghanaian history before the idea of civil society became the 
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Chapter 4 
Civil Society as Process in Ghana 
   
 
In the previous chapter, we saw how multiple categories of social actors conceive civil 
society as idea and how these conceptions influence their perceptions of reality and affect their 
actions.  This chapter describes the processes in civil society during the era in Ghanaian history 
when such an idea was not present and thus challenges the assumptions about reality 
encompassed in various conceptions of the idea.  Exposing the collective misrepresentation of 
civil society as idea, processes in civil society appear as a string of impermanent unified postures 
in relation to transitory issues.  The historical narrative of politics in Ghana from the Nationalist 
movement to the Fourth Republic presented in this chapter highlights how the state and civil 
society shape each other in a dialectical process, contrary to assumptions of the state and civil 
society being separate entities.  Through the rise and fall of a series of regimes since 
independence, we see that civil society as process is characterized by the actions and reactions of 
politically mobilized social groups seeking to challenge or support the status quo distribution of 
power.   
 
4.1  The Politics of Nationalism and the CPP State 
 
It is argued that nationalism is a form of politics, politics is about power, and in the 
modern world power is primarily about control of the state (Breuilly 1982).  The focus of 
nationalist movements in colonial Africa being to takeover the state, they had to develop the 
capacity for coordination and mobilization.  Both of these functions were closely related to the 
structure of the colonial state and the changes it underwent, as the colonial state responds to 
pressures from indigenous society and vice versa.  This conceptualization of nationalism as 
politics provides the framework for examining the anti-colonial struggle in the Gold Coast and 
for understanding the unique characteristics of state and society in independent Ghana.   
Constitutional reforms in the 1940s in the direction of self-government initiated by the  
British Colonial Governor provided an opportunity for the ‘intelligentsia’
14 to obtain a share of 
political authority.  With the restructuring of the colonial state towards a more liberal 
representative government, a group of intelligentsia created the United Gold Coast Convention 
(UGCC) in 1947.  However, the UGCC lacked legitimacy as a nation-wide movement and 
sought to take on board the grievances of other groups in society through forming a coalition 
with the ‘young men’ and cocoa farmers.   
Since colonial rule, commoners had acquired a greater sense of independence brought 
about by the curtailment of chiefly powers and income generated from an expanding market.  
The rise of ‘elementary-school-leavers’ and the creation of new forms of organization by 
commoners in the towns and villages resulted in the emergence of a new social force, known as 
the ‘young men’, with the general grievance that the structure of native-authority rule held no 
opportunities for them.
15  Nkrumah led the mobilization of the ‘young men’ and their alliance 
with the UGCC. 
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As for the cocoa farmers, they objected to cocoa price policies, the surplus extracted by 
the cocoa marketing board, and the policy of compulsory cutting-out of cocoa trees infected with 
swollen shoot disease.  Cocoa farmers’ opposition to compulsory cutting out contributed 
significantly to the strength of the anti-colonial movement.  Nationalist leaders supported the 
demands of farmers and attempts were made to bring the various existing farmers’ organizations 
together into an anti-colonial front.  The 1937/38 cocoa hold-up demonstrated the organizing 
potential of the cocoa farmers and their ability to threaten colonial interests (Beckman 1976: 52).   
Riots in 1948 caused a shifting of alliances in the indigenous society as a result of 
differences between the intelligentsia and the ‘young men’ over strategy and tactics of the 
nationalist movement.  Having been extended the opportunity by the colonial government to 
participate in the constitutional reform process, the intelligentsia embraced a reformist stance.  
The nationalist movement split.  Nkrumah formed the Convention People’s Party (CPP), taking 
most of the coalition support with him under the slogan ‘Self-government Now’, and the 
intelligentsia realigned with the chiefs against the CPP and Nkrumah. 
The 1951 elections for the first self-government institutions created an opportunity to 
acquire power, while at the same time extending the franchise and turning the nationalist 
movement into popular politics.  A twofold process took place where the CPP expanded through 
the country while the administration constructed an electoral framework for use by the 
competing parties (Austin 1964: 141).  The objective of the CPP was clearly to take over the 
colonial state, but others held the same objective evidenced by sub-nationalist movements that 
formed parties to contend the elections.  The CPP won a majority of elected seats to the 
Legislative Assembly, but it continued to be opposed from different directions in subsequent 
elections. 
The colonial government introduced a new constitution, which provided for the 
progressive reduction and transfer of the Governor’s powers to a full, internal self-government 
before independence.  In the campaign for the second general election in 1954, the CPP faced 
opposition from rebel candidates, as well as an opposition alliance of the Ghana Congress Party 
(UGCC reconstituted), the Northern People’s Party, the Moslem Association Party and the 
Togoland Congress.
16  Even with these internal divisions and challenges from outside the party, 
the CPP had three and a half years in office and was the only political movement capable of 
forming a government, so not surprisingly the CPP won the second round of elections (Austin 
1964: 194). 
Between 1954-56, a new struggle for power emerged between the CPP and the National 
Liberation Movement (NLM).  The NLM originated from the cocoa farmers’ protest over the 
CPP government’s attempt to set the price of cocoa below the market rate, but grew to embody 
the Asante Youth Association and its appeal to the Asante nation, the chiefs’ dislike for 
Nkrumah and the CPP, intellectuals formerly under the Ghana Congress Party and CPP 
dissidents (Austin 1964: 281).  The NLM repackaged these grievances into the demand for a 
federal constitution giving the regions more autonomy.  In response to the increasing 
confrontation between the NLM and CPP, the colonial government proposed a third general 
election in 1965.  Victorious again, the CPP formed the first government of independent Ghana. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
begun to cohere as a distinct social group.  See also Hodgkin (1956) for a discussion on the types of organizations 
developing in towns and villages. 
 
16 Rebel candidates refer to candidates sponsored in defiance of the CPP central committee at the constituency 
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As a result of economic and social development under colonialism, many classes were 
thrown up, some of which were organic, such as the early school-leavers, and others which 
emerged from conflict between social groups and the state, such as the cocoa farmers.  These 
classes began to develop political consciousness and to articulate their interests.  This process of 
nascent class formation fed into the nationalist movement, creating cleavages and producing 
factions within it.  The nationalist movement was a coalition of specific social forces with 
different interests in the anti-colonial struggle, and the composition of this coalition changed 
over time such that shifting alliances in a domestic struggle over power occurred within the 
broader opposition to colonial rule.  As a result, a precarious balance between national 
consciousness opposed to colonialism and a political consciousness based on local, particular 
demands existed.  Nkrumah effectively mobilized social groups behind him and his party to 
achieve independence and form the new government.   
After independence, the CPP identified itself with the ‘general will of the nation’ and the 
total power of the state, refusing to accept the legitimacy of any organized challenge and 
suppressing all opposition (Austin 1964).  In 1960, constitutional amendments turned Ghana into 
a Republic, leading to new presidential elections.  Nkrumah interpreted his victory in this 
election as a mandate for him and his party to carry out their vision of building a “socialist 
society” (Drake and Lacy 1966: 72).  These factors may explain the rise of the one-party state in 
1965, as well as the nature of state-society relations during CPP rule. 
Nkrumah perceived the CPP as the vehicle for the realization of socialism in Ghana.  
Every individual was expected to join the party, giving de facto allegiance to national socialist 
goals.  However, after 1960 the CPP constituency and branch organizations declined in 
significance within the party, and auxiliary organizations of the party became more important 
(Apter 1966).  These auxiliary organizations included existing organizations of social groups co-
opted by the party and new organizations created by the party to monopolize the mobilization of 
specific groups.  The two most important auxiliary organizations included the Trade Union 
Congress (TUC) and the cooperatives.
17  All women’s organizations were abolished except for 
the National Council of Ghana Women, and the youth were organized into the Young Pioneers.  
The CPP effectively smashed all independent organizations, increasing the state’s control over 
society. 
One case of the state creating an organization to acquire control over a specific social 
group involves the cocoa farmers.
18  Because the state’s financial basis and plans for national 
development rested on the cocoa trade surplus, cocoa trading was targeted as a vehicle for 
political mobilization and control (Beckman 1976).  In 1953, the CPP created the United Ghana 
Farmers’ Council (UGFC).  State control of the Cocoa Marketing Board fund allowed the CPP to 
monopolize the financial resources available to cocoa farmers and to eliminate cocoa trading as a 
platform for organized opposition.  The UGFC ascended in importance after 1961 with the 
structural changes within the party (Apter 1966).   
In contrast, The TUC demonstrates a case where the CPP was able to co-opt the existing 
organization (Apter 1966: 284).  However, many existing unions resisted incorporation into the 
framework of the party.  Both the extent of state control over the TUC leadership and the 
resistance of some unions to state and party policy can be illustrated by the general strike in 
Sekondi-Takoradi in September 1961.  The strike was provoked by a mandatory savings scheme 
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and new taxes introduced in the 1961 ‘austerity budget’.  While the 1961 budget was the spark 
that ignited the strike, disenchantment with the TUC amongst the rank-and-file had been 
smoldering since passage of the Industrial Relations Act of 1958.  This act placed the entire trade 
union movement under control of the TUC and required the most influential posts to be filled by 
individuals with CPP approval.  It also made strikes virtually illegal. Many union leaders 
questioned these changes, feeling that their leadership was being challenged and the autonomy of 
the unions threatened.  The most articulate and intransigent opposition came from within the 
ranks of the Sekondi-Takoradi Railway and Harbor Workers Union (Drake and Lacy 1966; see 
also Jeffries 1978).
19   
Steps taken after this strike exposed the increasingly authoritarian tendencies of the CPP 
government.  By 1962, the United Ghana Farmers’ Council, the National Cooperative Council, 
the Council of Ghana Women and the Ghana Trade Union Congress were ‘integral wings’ of the 
party, with CPP leaders in control of key posts (Drake and Lacy 1966: 72).  The CPP targeted 
these organizations for transformation into organs of the party and the state for two reasons 
(Apter 1966).  First, voluntary associations or occupational groupings under party supervision 
indirectly linked the individual to the party and the state.  Second, such organizations cut across 
geographical boundaries and other affinial bases of association, reducing the significance of 
ethnic and religious groups.   
With wings of the CPP covering farmers, trade unions, women, students and youth, and 
with the government controlling the appointment and dismissal of chiefs, the ability of sections 
of society to articulate public opinion or to influence the government appeared extremely limited 
(Pinkeny 1972: 18).  For instance, organizational leaders became isolated from the rank and file 
membership through party patronage; challenges to party control, such as the Sekondi-Takoradi 
strike, were crushed; and organized social forces not affiliated to the party, such as churches, the 
chieftaincy and businesses, found it increasingly difficult to have their voices heard.  Despite its 
spontaneous mass following, the CPP itself cohered as a loose network of personal alliances and 
contacts (Beckman 1976: 27-8).   In February 1966, a military coup ousted Nkrumah and his 
CPP government, establishing the National Liberation Council (NLC) as a caretaker government.  
The coup initiated a new period in Ghanaian post-colonial politics in which some social groups 
that had been demobilized under Nkrumah would play a critical role. 
 
4.2  Social Organizations as Channels of Mobilization 
 
As occupational structures became more autonomous, salient and active during the 
1970s, social groups in general became the means of political representation and mobilization.  
This process can be explained by several factors (Chazan 1983: 30).  First, their concretization as 
a channel for mobilization may be a reaction to the Nkrumahist attempt to curb the activities of 
these groups.  After the 1966 coup, many groups that had long kept their demands bottled up 
began lobbying the NLC, and new groups came into being.  Second, alternative structures for 
action, such as political parties, were either not offered or had not proven efficacious during this 
                                                  
19 The Sekondi-Takoradi strike resulted in the mobilization of the entire community. Workers may ignite social 
unrest because their grievances often resonate with other groups in society and because the labor movement 
possesses the organizational and ideological tools necessary for political mobilization.  The marketwomen and 
unemployed who joined the protests were motivated not only be their financial dependence on the railwaymen but 
also by the desire to add their grievances against Nkrumah’s government Jeffries, R. 1975. The Labour 
Aristocracy? Ghana Case Study. Review of African Political Economy 3:??-??.   
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time.  Third, these groups constituted an effective means of gaining access to available resources.  
The following narrative of Ghanaian politics from 1966-1981 focuses on social organizations as 
channels of mobilization and political representation. 
By the beginning of 1966, the CPP government’s handling of the economy had generated 
grievances in most sections of society: cocoa farmers, businessmen, workers, young persons 
unable to find employment, and consumers unable to obtain common items.  The 1966 coup 
drew its support from such grievances (Esseks 1975).  The coup provided one solution to the 
existing economic and social problems, but it created its own problems.   
The NLC tried to ally itself with those groups who between 1947 and 1957 identified 
themselves as the rightful inheritors of political power, as both groupings held a common interest 
in excluding the possibility of a new Nkrumah-type party coming to power again.  The NLC 
destroyed most of the nominally democratic machinery by suspending the Republican 
constitution.  Instead of mobilizing the ‘masses’, it preferred governing through consultation 
with various selected groups. The most important bodies allied with the NLC regime appear to 
have been traditional authorities and private enterprises: the former were needed to ensure 
support for and cooperation with the government at the local level and the latter to implement 
economic policy that relied heavily on the private sector (Chazan 1983: 21).  In effect, the NLC 
attempted to ban ‘politics’ in Ghana, seeking to replace politicians with civil servants (Dowse 
1975).   
The bureaucratic features of the NLC combined with its informal and ad hoc channels of 
communication with society produced a government structure that remained largely intact, as we 
shall see in section 4.3, until Rawlings attempted an institutional and social revolution to 
reconfigure the political terrain (Hutchful 2002).  Another effect of both the 1966 coup and NLC 
rule involved the politicization of the military and its emergence as a distinct, but heterogeneous 
social group in the political sphere (Chazan 1983: 102). 
In May 1969, the NLC lifted the ban on political parties, but prohibited political activity 
under the aegis of the former CPP.  Busia created the Progress Party (PP), heralded as successor 
of all political parties that had previously opposed the CPP.  The victory of the PP is not 
surprising given Busia’s close relationship with the NLC and the lack of any substantial 
opposition in the context of a discredited and illegal CPP (Chazan 1983: 223). 
Under the Busia government, the perception of an ethnic bias in access to state power and 
the dominance of the urban professional elite in government created tensions and posed potential 
obstacles to the political mobility of other groups.  In a context where parliamentary parties 
served less as channels for communication and political action and more as a medium of control 
by the state, dissent to the Busia government was rooted in functional organizations (Chazan 
1983: 221-5).  Politicization of the National Union of Ghanaian Students (NUGS), TUC, the 
civil service and the military occurred in response to policy measures as well as their perception 
of being excluded from the PP ruling coalition.  The government reacted to criticism of its 
policies and the political action of opposition groups by breaking up student demonstrations, 
quelling workers’ strikes, regulating the press, and using armed forces to detain opponents of the 
regime.  These repressive reactions contradicted its liberal democratic image and constitutional 
commitment (228).  The poor performance of Busia’s government eventually led to the 
disaffection of segments of those social forces that had supported its rise to power.   
In 1972, a coup headed by Colonel Acheampong took over the state and established the 
National Redemption Council (NRC).  Again, the coup was only a temporary solution to a 
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recurring problem of how to contain political dissent and mobilized social groups while 
effectively linking up with key sections of society to provide a stable political base.  His answer, 
similar to that of the NLC, focused on the purposeful destruction of participatory organs and the 
construction of a corporatist model of politics.  Forming alliances among soldiers, the police, 
senior bureaucrats and selected politicians, the NRC also tried to eradicate partisan politics 
(Gyimah-Boadi 1994: 127).   
After four highly publicized coup attempts, Acheampong recast the NRC in 1975 as the 
Supreme Military Council (SMC).  The executive structure of the SMC was defined by its strict 
military composition, its subjection to the whims of Acheampong and its heightened autonomy 
from society (Chazan 1983: 240).  Whatever the reasons for these changes, the effect was to 
discard the initial functional corporatism for a highly centralized, enclosed, repressive regime. 
Between 1975 and 1979, the combination of civilian exclusion and a waning economy 
led to increasing demands for policy changes.  The purveyors of these demands consisted mainly 
of urban elites, even though communal and mass bases for opposition did exist (Chazan 1983).  
The SMC reacted to the growing popular unrest in October 1976 by announcing the Union 
government proposal (Unigov)—an arrangement in which major social groups, the police and 
the military would share power on a non-partisan basis.  Support for Unigov became an indicator 
for determining which individuals and social groups would be included in the network of state 
and regime (Gyimah-Boadi 1994: 127).  Institutions such as the army, the police and a wide 
range of associations were mobilized in support of Unigov.
20  For these associations and their 
leadership, affiliation with the state and regime brought greater opportunities to be officially 
consulted or participate on some level in national decision-making.  As under previous regimes, 
affiliation was the only way social groups could have access to policymaking. 
Opposition to Unigov and the SMC coalesced into three main organizations: the People’s 
Movement for Freedom and Justice, the Prevention of Dictatorship, and the Third Force.  
Notwithstanding their differences, these organizations shared key common characteristics 
(Chazan 1983). First, they all included a large number of major politicians from previous 
regimes.  Second, their leaders had roots in the professional associations, particularly the Ghana 
Bar Association (GBA) and the Association of Recognized Professional Bodies (ARPB).
21  
Third, intra-elite conflicts kept them from uniting in a single anti-government front.  In 
conditions of general economic hardship, especially during the Achaempong period, autonomy-
seeking social organizations had to do without material support from the government and had 
only their own resources and skills.  Therefore, the class cleavage between pro-Unigov and anti-
Unigov groups is not surprising.  After the defeat of the referendum, Acheampong abandoned the 
pretense of co-opting the support of social groups and banned all opposition organizations.   
In July 1978, Acheampong and his SMC were replaced through an internal coup by 
Akuffo and the SMC II.  Akuffo stated from the outset that power would be turned over to a 
temporary representative civilian government that would oversee the drafting of a constitution.  
However, consensus within society on the ineptness of the SMC should not be confused with 
solidarity of purpose (Chazan 1983: 270). Through the mobilization of social groups, cleavages 
in society had become more pronounced.  Additionally, struggles at the center had represented 
                                                  
20 These associations included, among others, the Kumasi Youngsters Club, Ghana Peace and Solidarity Council, 
Organizers Council, Muslim Representative Council, Ghana Cooperative Council, and the Ghana Bakers’ 
Association (Gyimah-Boadi 1994: 127). 
21 The GBA teamed up with other middle class professionals to form the ARPB in 1977 to press for multiparty, 
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little more than political manoeuvres within an urban ‘middle class’ producing few significant 
structural changes in Ghana (Rathbone 1978).   
In 1979, another coup ousted Akuffo and his SMC II and established the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC) under the leadership of Flt. Lt. J.J. Rawlings.  Rawlings’ coup 
added a new dimension to the political landscape.  Power conflicts were previously determined 
by swings in position between certain organized social forces within the state orbit and those 
temporarily excluded from it.  Rawlings opened up the possibility of political conflict between 
the power ‘haves’ in their entirety and the ‘have-nots’ (Chazan 1983: 279).  Within the same 
year, Rawlings returned the government to civilian rule through national elections.
22   
The 1979 election brought to power a PNP government under Dr. Limann.  However, the 
Limann government proved in several ways to be little more than a reenactment of an old script 
with similar actors (Chazan 1983: 279).  For example, nonformal participation continued, as 
Limann granted leaders of major associations representation in state organs.  However, 
representation of the military, police, students and workers remained absent from such state 
organs, revealing the class bias of the new regime.  As another example, President Limann 
inherited a highly centralized state apparatus controlled by the executive.  His propensity towards 
personalized authority and the government’s inability to improve the declining state of the 
economy provoked immediate responses from society.  Students, intellectuals, workers and those 
linked to the AFRC formed the foci of agitation.  This opposition mirrored the constellation of 
forces backing Rawlings’ first coup, with the notable exception of those in the professional 
bodies who had successfully captured state power.  As will be seen shortly, discontent with 
Limann’s government largely carried over from anti-establishment propensities before the 1979 
elections (Chazan 1983: 312). 
  
4.3  Reconfiguring the Political Terrain  
 
Under the AFRC, a new radical movement had emerged with the objective of promoting 
political education and organizational programs among the urban poor, students, and in the rural 
areas.  The actions of progressive organizations such as the June Fourth Movement (JFM), New 
Democratic Movement (NDM) and Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards (KNRG) 
transformed the political arena.  By 1980, political opposition and activism was no longer 
dominated by the professional associations, trade unions, and political parties, as the militant 
style of political agitation employed by the progressive organizations challenged these functional 
groups and the agencies of state power (Akwetey 1994: 82). 
The coup that toppled the Limann government on December 31, 1981 occurred against 
the background of a severe political and economic crisis (Hansen 1987).  On the political front, 
parties were unable to articulate the interests of the broad masses of the people.  On the 
economic front, the balance of payments current account deficit was almost $500 million; 
production of raw materials for export was down to about one-third the levels of the 1960s; 
inflation was in three-figure digits; and public health, education, transport and roads were in 
terrible condition.  Therefore, when Rawlings announced that the 1981 coup was not a changing 
                                                  
22 Three major parties formed to contest the 1979 elections: the People’s National Party (PNP), constructed from the 
old CPP organization and backed by wealthy patrons, students, trade union leaders, farmers, clerks and the urban 
dispossessed; the Popular Front Party (PFP), self-proclaimed successor of Busia’s Progress Party and comprised 
partly of anti-Unigov organizations; and the United National Convention, a mirror of the PFP in terms of its social 
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of the palace guard but a revolution to transform the social and economic order, people were 
prepared to listen and give their support (Hansen 1987: 171). 
Rawlings defended the 1981 coup as necessary to create the conditions for a social and 
economic transformation.  However, diverse elements effected the coup, and each group had its 
own private conception of what to get from the coup and what society should look like after it 
(Hansen 1987).  As will be seen shortly, these diverse elements in leadership positions made it 
difficult for a coherent policy to emerge, and an intense struggle occurred for hegemony between 
the Right and the Left and among those constituting the Left.
23 
The Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) was set up as the highest policy 
making body, combining executive and legislative functions, but in practice laws came from 
Chairman Rawlings through decrees more than through a consensus of the Council.  Making no 
changes within the existing structure of the state apparatus to accommodate the transformation 
process, Rawlings created new structures outside the state—organs of ‘popular power’ (Hansen 
1987: 178-9).  These organs were intended to construct a counterpoise to the established 
structures of power.  In effect, many of these organs such as the defense committees asserted a 
position independent from the political leadership and did not readily subordinate their interests 
to that of the state.  The progressive organizations provided varying degrees of support for the 
PNDC regime and formed the organizational basis of the transformation, the most influential of 
these being the JFM, NDM and KNRG (Hansen 1987: 188).  A National Defence Committee 
was created from representatives of these progressive organizations to organize and manage the 
political movement and the defence committees. 
In the period between June 1982 and December 1983, conflicts arose between the 
contradictory elements in Rawlings’ coalition regime, as a result of the ambiguous ideological 
stance of the PNDC. The parameters of the struggle formed around economic strategy and the 
ability to attract financial assistance.  The Left failed to obtain external funding for its economic 
proposal and could not compete with the theory of neoclassical economics and the financial 
backing provided by the World Bank and IMF (Herbst 1993: 33).  The PNDC embraced a 
technocratic approach to economic liberalism in the form of its Economic Recovery Programme 
(ERP) supported by these international financial institutions (Akwetey 1994: 83, Hansen 1987: 
197-8).   
The World Bank and IMF provided the administrative and analytical resources necessary 
to make the ERP work, especially given that the state had all but collapsed (Herbst 1993: 36).  
However, there was a political price for this economic assistance.  By 1984, Rawlings had 
dissolved the National Defence Committee and delegitimized the Leftist elements originally in 
his regime.  Policy-making centered on a small macroeconomic team of government officials and 
foreign advisers, characterized by minimal information disclosure, no broad consultation and an 
absence of public accountability (Hutchful 2002).  
The PNDC drastically reordered the relative positions of social groups to resources and 
the terms of access to resources of the state.  In the process, it dispersed opposition from both the 
Left and the Right, destroying the possibility of opposition movements emerging from either 
direction.  By the late 1980s, Rawlings’ regime had combined its focus on economic reform with 
depoliticization of the popular organs, termination of autonomous organization, and general 
repression. 
                                                  
23 See Hansen (1987: 174-75) for a detailed description of the substance, composition and organization of the Left 
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The exact sequence of events leading to political reforms initiated by the PNDC regime 
in the late 1980s and the extent to which internal and external pressures caused these reforms are 
complex and controversial (see Ayee 1999; Bluwey 1998; Ninsin 1998).  The following 
discussion briefly outlines events leading to the ‘democratic transition’ from PNDC rule to the 
Fourth Republic and then focuses on the role of organized social forces during this period.   
In 1987, the PNDC announced its plans to establish District Assemblies under a policy of 
graduated development of representative institutions from local through regional to the national 
level (Ayee 1999: 122).  By 1989, 110 District Assemblies had been elected on a non-party 
basis.  In July 1990, Rawlings initiated national ‘consultations’ on the future political system, but 
these forums became dominated by Rawlings’ supporters advocating his version of no-party 
democracy (Ninsin 1996).  In March 1991, a summary report of these consultations produced by 
a body in the PNDC recommended a return to multiparty politics and the exclusion of the 
military from partisan politics.  The formal pronouncement of return to constitutional rule came 
in May 1991.  From that point, the schedule of the transition was set by the PNDC, but the 
opposition movement played a significant part in challenging it at every step. 
Opposition to Rawlings’ regime, the ‘pro-democracy movement’, was a fusion of several 
distinct groups and political agendas.  The resurgence of protest after 1985 has been attributed to 
a realignment of political forces in favor of the pro-democracy groups.
24   In August 1990, “a 
loose alliance of all the former political groupings of the first, second and third Republics” 
formed the Movement for Freedom and Justice (MFJ) (Ayee 1999: 321).  The MFJ found a 
common platform among functional organizations such as GBA, NUGS, TUC, Catholic Bishop 
Conference and Christian Council.  Together, they demanded democratic reforms from Rawlings 
and the PNDC.  Hutchful observes, “To an extent this could be seen as a regroupment of the 
broad-based civil opposition which had opposed the Acheampong regime, but disintegrated into 
rival ideological camps with the coming of the PNDC regime”(2002: 211).  The pro-democracy 
movement largely served to question and dispute the direction of political reforms initiated by 
Rawlings (see Ninsin 1996).   
Ninsin (1998) describes the ‘transition to democracy’ as a struggle between ‘pro-
democracy civil society’ and ‘alternative civil society’, where the pro-democracy group 
struggled for the liberalization of power and the alternative forces mobilized for the 
consolidation of the existing power structure.  The composition of the pro-democracy groups 
have been discussed above, so let us briefly explain what Ninisn calls the ‘alternative forces’.  
The economic reforms implemented since 1984 contributed to a rise in informal sector 
employment and increased the number of impoverished people, changing the country’s social 
structure at both the lower and middle class levels (see Ninsin 1991).  Ironically, Rawlings 
mobilized precisely those economically and politically weak social forces, which were easily 
dependent on the state, to carry him through the elections.  Rawlings built a support base in the 
Committees for the Defence of the Revolution, the District Assemblies, the 31st December 
Women’s Movement, the Ghana Private Road Transport Union, the June 4
th Movement, the 
chiefs and the Mobisquads. 
                                                  
24 Ninsin (1998) argues that when the workers and other radical groups realized that Rawlings’ regime no longer 
represented their interests, or aspired to, they abandoned their earlier political position in support of the ‘revolution’ 
and turned in opposition to Rawlings.   However, this view may be idealized, as Herbst (1993) argues that the 
mobilization of workers outside normal union channels and the appointment of new labor leaders effectively split 
the labor movement.  The willingness of the PNDC to use violence against opponents of the regime was another 
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Ninsin (1998) perceives transition politics as a continuation of the struggles for political 
reforms instigated by the 1981 coup.  From 1982-84, the struggle for constitutional rule took the 
form of a struggle for power to overthrow the military regime, and then it shifted to a movement 
for democratic reforms between 1987-92.  The failure of the pro-democracy movement to 
undermine the PNDC’s legitimacy in the first period stemmed mainly from the elite character of 
the organizations engaged in the movement, such as the ARPB, GBA and the established church 
councils, and the level of popular and student support for Rawlings.  In the second period, the 
alternative forces challenged the hegemony and monopoly of these pro-democracy groups in 
various sub-sectors of the economy, administration and politics (see Hansen 1991).  Ninsin 
shows that various social classes were engaged in the transition process, pursuing a democratic 
project with varying meanings.  The confrontational nature of the ‘pro-Rawlings’ and ‘anti-
Rawlings’ cleavage characterizing the democratic transition polarized society and politicized the 
organized social forces on each side, a rift that would take well into the next decade to heal.   
After the ban on political parties was lifted, the pro-democracy and alternative 
movements faded from the political scene (Ninsin 1998: 74).  Between the referendum on the 
new constitution in April 1992 and the national elections of November-December 1992, the 
struggle for power became the primary preoccupation of leading politicians and organized social 
forces.  Rawlings converted his PNDC into the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and won 
the presidential election.  The NDC government remained in power from 1993 to 2000.  Changes 
and continuities in this period of Ghanaian politics, particularly in the landscape of active social 
organizations and salient issues are considered in Chapter Five.  Chart 4.1 contains a summary of 
the governments of Ghana from independence to the present. 
 
Chart 4.1 
Governments of Ghana (1957-2002) 
Date  Government  Head of Government  Type 
1957- 
1965-6 
CPP  K. Nkrumah  Civilian multiparty,  
Civilian one-party 
1966-69  NLC  E. Kotoka/ A.A. Afrifa  Military 








1978-9  SMC II  F.W.K Akuffo   
1979 
(June-Sept) 









2001-present  NPP  J. Kufour  Civilian multiparty 
 
 
4.3  Conclusion 
 
Actual processes of civil society within a specific country context demonstrate that the 
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permanent unity where there is only fleeting unity, and that civil society as process is 
characterized by power struggles.  Specifically, we see that alliances between organized social 
forces shift according to the changing political and economic context.  Not only does the 
composition of social forces within civil society change, but they are not always mobilizing 
‘against the state’ and may be mobilizing to achieve contradictory objectives.  The history of 
Ghanaian politics shows that social groups mobilizing to influence or change the regime in 
power (such as the nationalist movement, opposition to Unigov and the SMC, and opposition to 
Rawlings and the PNDC) often encountered organized groups with access to state resources 
supporting the status quo (such as the auxiliary organizations of the CPP, the associations 
supporting Unigov, and both the popular organs and the ‘alternative civil society’ created by 
Rawlings).  Therefore, there are no intrinsic qualities in civil society determining its objectives.  
Instead, civil society should be visualized as a field of struggle between organized social forces 
in which changes in the determinants of the struggle and in the economic and political context 
affect the outcome.  Such determinants, as outlined in Chapter One, include the salient issues 
which affect particular groups in society or society as a whole, the forms that organized social 
forces adopt to address these issues, personal networks revealing who is involved in particular 
issues and why, external influences and international linkages, and material incentives and the 
distribution of state resources.   
The case of Ghana exposes the fallacy in descriptions of civil society as static, as 
something a country does or does not have, and as ‘weak’ or ‘strong’.  Such descriptions only 
make sense in relation to some idea of civil society against which reality is compared.  But it is 
exactly these theories of civil society, which combine observable actions with ideological 
predispositions and moral principles, that obscure what is actually happening in civil society. 
Within the processes of civil society in Ghana, specific trends can be identified that may 
help to understand changes and continuities in Ghanaian politics.  The CPP mobilized particular 
groups in society to galvanize enough support to win three elections before independence.  After 
1957, Nkrumah demobilized social groups by bringing them under the party’s control or by 
creating new organizations that monopolized the right to represent certain social groups such as 
cocoa farmers or workers.  However, these groups did not remain demobilized forever.  After the 
1966 coup, existing organizations and new organic ones became channels for mobilization, 
usually in opposition to military rule.  Even during the short periods of civilian multiparty 
government, social organizations provided the vehicle for individuals to engage in politics, as 
political parties and Parliament were not seen to represent people’s interests.  Several regimes 
tried to build corporatist models incorporating social organizations, the civil service and the 
military in an attempt to order the chaos thrown up from economic and political crises and to 
forge structural links with society.  In some African countries, ethnic and religious associations 
have stepped into politics and provided a means of political mobilization, but in Ghana these 
social cleavages were not a strong enough basis for representation.  Instead, functional 
organizations, such as NUGS, TUC and GBA, became conduits for political mobilization and 
representation. However, different objectives compel collective political action among these 
social groups and their organizations.   
This mobilization of social organizations has led to their politicization.  Gradually, social 
groups develop an improved capacity for collective action and concomitant expectations to 
participate in national decision-making.  Such improvements in organizational capabilities can 
change the political landscape and the power balance between state and societal groups.  
However, this chapter illustrates that contradictions arise at junctures between mobilization for 
protest and mobilization for control, when politicized groups are thwarted in their efforts to shift 
from support networks to participating and influencing national policy.  The legacy of Nkrumah QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS92    Page 39 
 
has been to keep national decision-making within a small group of people, creating a 
juxtaposition of politicization with departicipation by the end of the 1980s.   
Based on the above discussion, it is argued that processes in civil society contain 
elements of participation, exclusion and manipulation of the idea of participation for the 
purposes of exclusion.  This theme and the historical background provided in this chapter are 
essential to discerning the continuities and changes between this era in Ghanaian politics and the 
contemporary period where civil society as idea is the hegemonic perspective through which 
state-society relations are understood.  We now turn to the contemporary period, as Chapter Five 
looks at how civil society as process adapts to the political opening and the saturation of civil 
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Chapter 5 
The Dialectics of Idea and Process: 
Civil Society in Ghana 
 
 
The historical narrative of Chapter Four concluded with the return to multiparty, 
constitutional rule in 1993.  Akwetey (1998) argues that the decentralization reforms initiated by 
the PNDC signal the beginning of a shift from violent to deliberative politics, for they created 
limited space for domestic political groups to engage the PNDC on ideas to democratize politics 
at the level of the central state.  After the 1995 demonstrations over the Value-Added Tax, 
further openings for dialogue emerged in the form of national forums on governance and the 
economy.  These openings for dialogue and limited participation were trailed by the emergence 
of multiple social groups interacting with the state and government on different levels (Akwetey 
1998).  About the same time as this reorganization in society and in relations between the state 
and society, we see the emergence of the idea of civil society in the political discourse. 
This chapter demonstrates how the influence of civil society as idea on perceptions and 
actions of multiple categories of actors link up with existing processes in civil society in Ghana.  
As will become evident, usage of the idea does not substantially alter these earlier processes, but 
nonetheless has concrete effects.  The following discussion outlines some of these effects.  It 
begins with a brief background on NGO-state relations under Rawlings, from PNDC rule to the 
NDC government.  Against this background, the features of what is called ‘civil society’ in 
Ghana today are explored, drawing on information from a survey of urban-based organizations 
and two case studies. 
5.1 NGO-State Relations under Rawlings 
 
Under PNDC rule, NGOs and other social organizations operated in a generally 
repressive political climate which left them little room to organize and act on their own initiative.  
Even in the early stages of the ‘revolution’, Rawlings viewed NGOs and other independent 
bodies like the churches and trade unions as a potential threat to a regime struggling to secure 
power (Hutchful 2002: 185).  This initial hostility receded as the social costs of the Economic 
Recovery Programme (ERP) became more visible and the protests against Rawlings’ regime 
more vocal.   
As part of a strategy to quell growing opposition to the ERP, Rawlings’ regime 
encouraged NGOs to fill the service delivery gap created as a result of cuts in government 
expenditure.  However, the real impetus behind creating a greater role for NGOs in 
‘development’ came not from the PNDC, but from donors (Hutchful 2002).  At a donors’ 
conference in 1987, the Program of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment 
(PAMSCAD) was approved and attached to Ghana’s Structural Adjustment Program (Brydon 
and Legge 1996).  The World Bank, United Nations and bilateral donors contributed over US$80 
million for poverty alleviation programs, but they requested that NGOs assist in service-delivery 
because the “Government of Ghana” did not have the “institutional capacity” to implement such 
a large program (Gary 1996: 157). 
This increased interest in NGOs as participants in ‘development’, with its attendant 
increase in available international aid, affected the nature of NGO-state relations.  For example, 
the PNDC government and the United Nations Development Programme decided to use the 
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organization founded in 1980 as a forum for information sharing, as the vehicle for enlisting 
NGOs in PAMSCAD.  GAPVOD had only seventeen members in 1987, but through PAMSCAD 
it received over US$600,000 from 1990-92 and membership in GAPVOD became a de facto 
criteria for local NGOs to receive external funding.  As a result, GAPVOD no longer existed as a 
collective voice for NGO members, but as a tool of control by government and donors (Gary 
1996). 
As mentioned in Chapter Four, the PNDC became the NDC in the run up to the 1992 
elections, and the NDC secured popular support by creating new organizations financed by and 
loyal to the ruling regime.  This popular base was sustained under the NDC government and has 
been identified as a significant factor in Rawlings victory in the 1996 elections (see Sandbrook 
and Oelbaum 1999).  In addition to the creation of ‘governmental non-governmental 
organizations’ through establishing new organizations to capture a constituency or transforming 
organs of the revolution into NGOs, the NDC employed various means of co-opting existing 
organizations with the result that few organizations have remained entirely outside Rawlings’ 
influence (see Smith 1998).   
In early 1995, the NDC government circulated a draft ‘NGO Bill’.  Within a context of 
increased competition among the state and NGOs for declining levels of external aid, this bill 
embodied the continued hegemonic ambitions of the state to control NGO activity (Gary 1996: 
162).  An earlier version of this bill had been shelved because of strong pressure from foreign 
NGOs (Oquaye 1996: 23).  The 1995 bill also encountered intense resistance on the grounds that 
it was a direct attack on the autonomy of NGOs.  The Integrated Social Development Centre, 
which led this resistance, perceived it as “a mechanism designed to get them to fit in with 
government’s designs” (ISODEC quoted in Gary 1996: 162).  The government withdrew the bill, 
and the successful campaign appeared to reflect an increasing confidence of many NGOs to 
assert their autonomy from the government. 
 
5.2  ‘Civil Society’ in the 1990s
25 
 
The previous discussion depicts the nature of relations between the P/NDC governments 
and social organizations as well as the influence of international actors.  It becomes evident that 
processes in civil society continue to be characterized by participation, exclusion and 
manipulation of the idea of participation for the purposes of exclusion.  The junction between 
civil society as idea and the ever-changing landscape of civil society as process that occurs in the 
1990s does not considerably alter theses process, but rather various actors use the idea of civil 
society as another means to engage each other.  The importance of analyzing the interaction 
between the idea and existing processes becomes clear if one emphasizes that occupational and 
functional organizations, such as the TUC or NUGS, that have existed in Ghana since 
independence are now called ‘civil society organizations’ and that universities, the mass media 
and churches have become ‘civil society institutions’. 
Deconstructing what is commonly referred to as ‘civil society’ in Ghana discloses the 
continuities with past processes in civil society and removes the romanticism and mystification 
created by the idea of civil society.  It also reveals some of the changes taking place within civil 
society as a result of the changing political context.  This deconstruction is undertaken in two 
ways. First, information collected from a survey of urban-based ‘civil society organizations’ is 
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used to make generalizations about the composition of ‘civil society’ in terms of actors, 
objectives and expected outcomes (or who is doing what, why and how).
26  Second, two case 
studies of coalition organizations provide a means of examining in detail these generalizations.  
Both of these methods reveal how the idea of civil society merges with existing motives and 
processes to produce new circumstances, both expanding and limiting opportunities for 
participation. 
 
5.2.1  Actors, Objectives and Expected Outcomes 
The question of who are the actors in Ghanaian ‘civil society’ produces two responses: 
one at the organizational level and another at the individual level.  At the level of organization, 
several salient features appear.  A majority of the currently active ‘civil society organizations’ 
were established in the post-democratic transition period.  This proliferation of organizations 
after 1992 probably occurred as a result of changes in the rules of governance and the previous 
legally and physically repressive political environment.  The correlation between this political 
opening and the proliferation of organizations is supported by the case of the Institute of 
Economic Affairs (IEA).  Registered in 1989, IEA only functioned part-time due to political 
repression and physical attacks on the leadership, until 1991 when the PNDC government 
became more amenable (C. Mensa, interviewed 31/07/01).  The post-1992 period also witnessed 
the emergence of a new type of organization: ‘think tanks’, policy centers and research institutes.  
Another feature at the organizational level involves international linkages.  Local 
affiliates of international organizations or networks are prevalent, with nine out of twenty 
organizations in the survey originating from some type of international link.  In general, these 
links result from foreign organizations establishing branch organizations, such as the Save the 
Children Fund-Ghana and Third World Network-Africa, or from continent-wide organizations 
establishing a local chapter in Ghana, such as the Forum of African Women Educationalist and 
Women in Law and Development in Africa.  The degree of organizational and financial 
autonomy beyond the initial stage differs among the organizations.  Two cases are unique and 
require further elaboration.  First, as indicated in Chapter Three, the Center for Policy Analysis 
was a World Bank project and is maintained by financial support from donors.  Second, the 
establishment of IEA stemmed from the founder’s personal contacts with the Atlas Foundation 
and the CATO institute in the United States, which contributed the initial funding (J. Mensa, 
interviewed 25/07/01).   
A final feature at the organizational level concerns the importance of external funding.  
With the exception of the three occupation-based mass organizations that finance themselves 
largely from member dues, all other organizations included in the survey rely predominantly on 
external sources of finance.  Issue-oriented organizations rely largely on funding from donor 
agencies and international NGOs.  Some organizations depend heavily on one constant source of 
funding, while others apply to multiple donor agencies on a project-by-project basis.  The ‘think 
tanks’, policy centers and research institutes depend on donor assistance, but they also earn 
finances through consultancy work.  As Chapter Three indicated, the American, Danish, Dutch 
and Canadian government agencies constitute the most active bilateral donors in Ghana, in 
addition to the World Bank and United Nations Development Programme.  One possible 
exception to this trend of dependency on external financing involves ISODEC, which raises 40 
percent of its funding domestically. 
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At the individual level, the composition of an organization’s leadership indicates some 
reasons for the existing landscape of organizations in Ghana and provides a background for 
understanding how and why certain organizations form coalitions.  Individuals with international 
connections constitute an important element, as in the case of IEA.  Another important element is 
prior activism.  Of notable interest are the biographies of Graham and Abugre.  Graham played 
an active part in the early stages of the Rawlings’ revolution as an intellectual leader of the 
National Democratic Movement.
27  Abugre, also a leader in a progressive organization, became a 
political leader in northern Ghana after the coup in 1981.  As discussed in Chapter Four, a split 
occurred between Rawlings and the Left in 1983.  After this split, Aburgre moved to working in 
low-income communities (Abugre, interviewed 31/08/01).  He helped to establish ISODEC, an 
organization working in rural water and sanitation. Abugre left Ghana in 1987, and during his 
time abroad he formed relationships with individuals in international NGOs mobilizing against 
structural adjustment. As will be seen shortly, these relationships played a crucial part in 
bringing SAPRI to Ghana.  Abugre returned to Ghana in 1994 largely to set up Third World 
Network-Africa, an organization focusing on research for policy advocacy, which ISODEC 
hosted from 1994 to 1999. Graham also started working for Third World Network-Africa in 
1994.  When TWN and ISODEC separated administratively and financially in 2000, Graham 
became the Director of TWN and Abugre took over ISODEC, which had expanded its activities 
to incorporate policy advocacy on multiple issues. 
Social networks, a second feature at the individual level, are somewhat related to prior 
activism.  Social networks arise from contacts between individuals leading to contacts between 
organizations, or from overlapping membership, or even leadership, in several organizations.  A 
good example of social networks involves the International Federation of Women Lawyers 
(FIDA), Women in Law and Development in Africa (WILDAF) and the Gender Studies and 
Human Rights Documentation Center (Gender Center).  Dorcas Coker Appiah worked with 
FIDA on its legal literacy program.  In 1990, she and other Ghanaian women attended a 
conference, at which time the idea of establishing an African branch of WILDAF with the goal 
of extending legal literacy programs was discussed.  Appiah became the project coordinator of 
WILDAF and created a Ghana chapter based on the programs she used at FIDA.  Appiah was 
also one of four women who set up the Gender Center in 1995.  All three organizations are 
involved in the Network for Women’s Rights, one of the case studies to be discussed below. 
From the survey of ‘civil society organizations’, three patterns in their objectives appear.  
The first pattern concerns information dissemination and mobilization.  Information 
dissemination can be targeted at a specific group, but often the target is the general public.  The 
importance of information dissemination arises from the lack of available information on a 
specific topic, such as violence against women, or an unawareness that such information exists, 
such as laws and constitutional rights.  Information dissemination is linked to mobilization 
because information is instrumental in building ‘awareness’ and ‘raising the consciousness of the 
people’, necessary prerequisites for mobilizing people around an issue. 
Related to this first pattern, many organizations are engaged in research and advocacy, in 
which the objective is not to build public awareness but to influence policy.  Two new patterns in 
civil society as process can be identified within this objective.  First, a shift from the project-
based objectives of service-delivery NGOs to a new type of organization which either continues 
to carry out projects but adds advocacy, or which carries out projects specifically for advocacy.  
Second, the quantity of local research has increased.  In addition to research institutes, policy 
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centers and think tanks, small issue-based organizations are also conducting their own research 
in order to produce reliable information that can both educate the public and support their stance 
on policy issues.   
While this emphasis on information dissemination, mobilization, research and advocacy 
merits attention because of its novelty, two caveats need mentioning so as not to be misleading.  
One, the traditional service-delivery NGOs still comprise the majority of ‘civil society 
organizations’, a feature not captured in my survey because of the urban bias and small sample 
size.  Two, organizations have in the past been engaged in education and information 
dissemination, such as during opposition movements, radical movements or general membership 
education. 
Perhaps the significance of these objectives appears in connection with their expected 
outcomes, as most organizations share common expectations regarding the outcomes of their 
activities and programs.  Most of the organizations mentioned capacity building as a desired 
outcome of their operations.  ‘Capacity building’—a new fad term in development discourse—
means different things to different people, but it is possible to distinguish some overlapping 
elements.  Generally, it refers to improving organizational skills and members’ knowledge of the 
issues in which the organization involves itself.  Reference to the need for ‘capacity building’ 
captures the obstacles organizations face when they try to expand or shift their objectives 
towards more advocacy-oriented activities: 
Until recently, NGOs did not attempt to intervene in policy debates and discussions, that was seen as 
political.  NGOs usually operate under laws that strictly say that they ought not to be political, so many of 
them have had a history of service delivery and involving themselves in policy advocacy is new, and thus 
NGOs don’t have the experience and knowledge for advocacy work (Tsikcata, interviewed 22/08/01). 
 
A second broadly defined expected outcome involves the demand for more political 
space and participation.  The following quote from the President of IEA regarding his experience 
between 1989-91 illustrates one definition of the term ‘space’:  
These were all struggles for space; government didn’t feel like letting go and we also felt like government 
had to let go, because space was required for good policymaking—needed debate, can’t run a country 
without debate (C. Mensa, interviewed 31/07/01). 
 
In another example, a member of ABANTU for Development repeatedly used this term to 
describe the problem his organization sought to address:  
Looking back at where they came from, [the African women who founded the organization in London] 
could see the inequalities, discrimination, lack of space for women to participate in political processes, lack 
of space for women to be involved in decision-making at the local up to the national level, where decisions 
are taken that affect women, and yet women are not given enough space to influence such decisions, 
policies and programs that are formulated (Antwi-Boasiako interviewed 01/08/01). 
 
In general, usage of the term ‘space’ may denote the assertion of the right of citizens to 
participate in political processes. These themes of space and participation occupy center stage in 
the case studies discussed next. 
 
5.2.2  Case Study 1: Civil Society Coordinating Council and Its Role in SAPRI 
 
The Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI) in Ghana emerged 
from negotiations between a group of international NGOs and the World Bank, an initiative with 
its own history of relations between international social actors and international financial 
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its critics in the NGO community.  From 1995-96, Wolfensohn set up a World Bank-NGO 
working group composed on NGOs from around the world.  He also met with local NGOs in 
many client countries, including Ghana, to discuss structural adjustment programs.  In 1997, 
SAPRI was launched in thirteen countries as a tripartite process between the Bank, governments 
and ‘civil society’ to review structural adjustment programs. 
Parallel to these negotiations with the World Bank leading to SAPRI, a group of 
international NGOs established the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative 
Network (SAPRIN).   As a global network, SAPRIN aims “to expand and legitimize the role of 
civil society in economic policymaking” and “to strengthen the organized challenge to structural 
adjustment programs by citizens around the globe.”
28  As secretariat of SAPRIN, Doug Hellinger 
of the Development Group for Alternative Policies explained why his “Northern group” assumed 
leadership of this initiative:  
It is our governments that are pushing these policies through international institutions on the countries of 
the South and it is our job to create space for our colleagues” (www.saprin.org/overview, emphasis added). 
 
The SAPRIN secretariat contacted an organization in each candidate country to initiate 
the SAPRI process.  As alluded to above, Abugre met Hellinger while participating in the World 
Bank-NGO working group as a representative of Third World Network (TWN).  When he 
returned to Ghana, Abugre continued this work as a representative of TWN-Africa and ISODEC.  
When SAPRI was designed, Abugre, and later Graham, became SAPRIN steering committee 
members.  In this way, Ghana became a candidate country for the SAPRI exercise, and 
TWN/ISODEC became the lead organization to convene SAPRI in Ghana.29 
The domestic environment into which SAPRI entered merits attention because it provides 
a framework for understanding SAPRI as a Ghanaian exercise.  Since 1983, the economic 
reforms proposed by the World Bank and the IMF have defined Ghana’s strategy for economic 
growth and poverty reduction.
30  Initial official reports argued that a decade of SAP, 
characterized by a 5% average growth rate, had led to a reduction in poverty.  This view was 
challenged by 1992 poverty figures that disaggregated the total number of people living in 
poverty to show a decrease in poverty in rural areas but an increase in the urban areas.  The 
population of the city’s capital, Accra, living in poverty increased from 8.5 percent in 1988 to 23 
percent in 1992, which may reflect migration from the countryside into a stagnant labor market 
(Hormeku 2000).  Beneath these figures lie the facts that formal sector employment in 1991 was 
45% less than in 1980, representing an average annual decrease of 3.7% compared with an 
average annual growth rate in the labor force of 3.2% (Boateng 2001: 18).  Additionally, the 
reduction in government expenditure has been most pronounced in health and education (see 
Jackson 2001).   
Despite political liberalization in 1992, national economic policy has not been open for 
public discussion.  Public demonstrations in response to the Value Added Tax occurred as a 
result of opposition parties operating outside Parliament, the NDC government’s refusal to 
discuss economic policy questions with the opposition, and the technocratic approach to 
economic policy-making maintained since 1983 (Akwetey 1998: 17).  As indicated at the start of 
this chapter, the 1995 riots sparked a process of political opening, evidenced in one way by the 
government’s decision to hold two National Economic Forums between 1996-7.  With the 
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opening of dialogue on national economic policy, leading critics of SAPs voiced concerns that 
discussing future economic policy must commence with an understanding and acknowledgment 
of problems with previous policies, in order to avoid repeating past mistakes and ignoring 
current problems.     
Support for the idea of SAPRI in Ghana emerged from diverse sources, particularly 
organizations and individuals with a history of opposition to some element of structural 
adjustment and its effects on Ghanaians.  ISODEC presented the idea of SAPRI to leaders of 
other organizations, who then formed the Provisional Working Group with the task of bringing 
additional groups into the SAPRI exercise.
31  This first outreach effort culminated in a “National 
Conference on Civil Society” that brought together representatives of organizations from around 
the country.  At this conference, participants established the Civil Society Coordinating Council 
(CivisoC) for the purpose of representing ‘civil society’ in the SAPRI exercise vis-a-vis the 
World Bank and NDC government.  The membership of CivisoC was structured along the lines 
of geographical boundaries, organizational typology, and the notion of representation.
32 
The network headed by CivisoC evinces four new qualities in the history of mobilization 
among organized social forces (Graham 1999).  One, it involved an unprecedented cooperation 
among organizations with virtually no history of collaboration.  Two, this network is the first 
broad structure for institutionalized policy dialogue with government.  Three, its geographical 
breadth of participation is novel, especially in its inclusion of the three northern regions that have 
tended to be marginalized in most national processes.  Four, CivisoC provided a holistic 
challenge to SAPs as a development strategy, in contrast to past sectoral approaches such as 
criticism of wage freezes or effects on health services.  
While SAPRI originated from an urban, educated group of organizations, genuine efforts 
were made to extend participation in this exercise to a broader cross-section of society.  
However, in the second round of outreach efforts, CivisoC encountered several obstacles.  In 
moving from the framework and rules established at the global level to the local context, 
weaknesses appeared in Ghana’s ability to participate in such an exercise, due to the general lack 
of knowledge and understanding of SAPs in society. CivisoC employed various programs at 
regional and community levels to simultaneously educate and mobilize citizens around 
macroeconomic policy, SAPs and the World Bank.  The necessity of this process of ‘economic 
literacy’ indicates the engagement of sections of society previously oriented to the government 
and development issues in more passive ways. 
The SAPRI project in Ghana faced many obstacles and probably achieved few of the 
globally stated objectives. Technically, SAPRI was originally conceived to take 18 months.  It 
actually took 4 years to complete, which caused financial and motivational problems.  
Organizationally, several members of the SAPRI secretariat emphasized that building a ‘civil 
society’ coalition and working in a coalition structure took time.  Some of the obstacles 
encountered included the project-based background of organizations, their different experiences 
under structural adjustment, their different expectations of what a coalition meant, and 
difficulties mobilizing to discuss policy without material benefit or compensation.  Politically, 
the NDC government maintained minimal participation and exhibited a political indifference that 
limited the ability to mobilize people: “Government is still the most important agent in society, 
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and without its active support, SAPRI lost part of its legitimacy” (Hormeku, interviewed 
18/08/01).  Akilagpa Sawyerr, Chairman of the Tripartite National Steering Committee 
commented that the government’s absence at the First National Forum placed the World Bank, 
rather than government, in the position of interlocutor between ‘civil society’ and the SAPRI 
exercise
33: 
The Bank’s central role in policy-making in all our countries is the result only part of the Bank’s own 
pushing but mostly by our own people.  It is the failure of our governments and our leaders to take full 
control and responsibility for policy-making in our country… (SAPRI National Forum Proceedings, p.58). 
 
In contrast to SAPRI as a global project, the SAPRI exercise in Ghana was used to 
achieve local objectives and thus produced several benefits.  The national actors with links to 
SAPRIN—Graham, Abugre and Hormeku—maintain that the objectives of SAPRI in Ghana 
focused on building broad awareness about the World Bank and its policies and on mobilizing a 
domestic constituency for continuous engagement.  The discussions on SAPs held across the 
country leading to the topics chosen for research and the participatory field investigations 
conducted as part of the research process constituted new ways of mobilizing sections of society.  
SAPRI and CivisoC together provided a framework for communicating on macroeconomic 
issues, for information dissemination and for general mobilization.  In some ways, the SAPRI 
exercise even legitimated ordinary people’s opinions and perceptions.  
A second benefit produced through SAPRI involved changes in state-society relations.  
The SAPRI exercise can be seen as initiating a ‘new way of doing things’.  CivisoC embodied an 
attempt to present a collective voice to engage the government and World Bank in policymaking, 
as opposed to individual group pressure or collective action through demonstrations.  SAPRI also 
facilitated existing efforts by some participant organizations to increase people’s knowledge of 
their right to participate in governance:   
Under the 1992 constitution, people are supposed to participate in policymaking at all levels, but are they? 
It’s a rights question…Getting people to understand that government is not an agent that they give all rights 
to when it is elected, that people still have a right to engage in decision-making, have the right to be 
consulted on major national policy, the right to information, right to question, right to know what’s going 
on (Kuyole, interviewed 10/08/01).   
 
In Ghana, where a few people in a few ministries produce national policies, SAPRI constitutes 
only a first step at attempting to alter this norm (ibid).   
A third benefit from the SAPRI exercise could be seen in its ability to start building trust 
between the government and politicized social groups.  Many of the leading members involved 
in the SAPRI exercise had a history of confrontation with each other, especially Rawlings and 
his technocratic circle versus Graham and Abugre and their new version of ‘progressive 
organizations’.  The World Bank’s record of financially supporting the PNDC regime produced 
negative perceptions on the part of some ‘civil society’ representatives towards the World Bank 
and its involvement in national affairs.  However, “participation is pedagogical,” and in the case 
of Ghana, participation may build trust between previously antagonistic sections in society 
(Akwetey, interviewed 13/08/01).
34 
In addition to the SAPRI exercise, CivisoC has been used to facilitate countrywide 
consultations for the World Bank on its Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) and to brief the 
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transition team of the new NPP government on the views and opinions of ‘civil society’.  Such 
examples of its utility led to discussions among its members on maintaining CivisoC after the 
completion of SAPRI.  However, Graham remarks that the optimum future scenario for the 
World Bank out of the SAPRI engagement would be to build a new type of link with civil 
society at the national level that would provide a stable institutionalized framework for 
participation and consultation.
35  Ramm noted that the organizational representatives on CivisoC 
had not rotated, and thus it had become an institution (interviewed 30/08/01).  Other CivisoC 
members expressed positive aspects about continuing to use CivisoC as an organizational means 
of engaging in policy discussions with the Bank and government.   
 
5.2.3  Case Study 2: Network for Women’s Rights 
 
Understanding the emergence of the Network for Women’s Rights (NETRIGHT), what it 
is and what it aspires to do, requires knowledge of the 31
st December Women’s Movement. 
Emerging in 1982 immediately after the coup, the Movement constitutes one instrument the 
P/NDC used to mobilize support.  While who founded the Movement may be contested, it 
undisputedly came under the leadership of Mrs. Rawlings and effectively served as the women’s 
wing of the NDC party.  The Movement mobilized women through its projects, which received 
state resources as well as donor assistance channeled through the state (Gyimah-Boadi 1994: 
136).  After the democratic transition, the Movement transformed its image into an ‘apolitical’ 
NGO.  Nonetheless, in both guises the Movement overshadowed the national machinery for 
women: the National Council for Women and Development (NCWD) (Manuh 1993).  The 
Movement, with the NCWD under its control, attempted to manipulate other women’s 
organizations through its control over funds and its monopoly on information.  The Movement’s 
political power, emanating from its close relationship to the ruling party, allowed it to fulfill its 
hegemonic ambition to be the only legitimate voice of Ghanaian women (Smith 1998).  
NETRIGHT can be seen as the end product of an ongoing dialogue among a group of women on 
the need for an organization independent of the Movement.   
The story of NETRIGHT’s creation has no distinct beginning or end, because  
NETRIGHT is not another organization, but an attempt to mobilize women within a changing 
political context.  Third World Network-Africa initiated a research study on national machinery 
for women in eight African countries.  In September 1999, the research findings on Ghana’s 
National Machinery for Women were disseminated at a meeting of organizations involved or 
interested in gender issues.  At this meeting, attendants agreed on the need to form a coalition 
and act on these research findings.  The TWN research essentially created an opportunity for 
women who wanted to push forward women’s rights in Ghana to mobilize around a particular 
issue.  Attendants also decided to write an ‘alternative report’ to the NCWD report on the status 
of women in Ghana for the Beijing+5 International Conference on Women.  The launch of this 
report marked another chance for activists to discuss forming a network.  While discussions were 
still taking place among organizations over the nature of the network, they became involved in 
advocacy over serial killings of women.  Through the course of a year the structure of the 
network coalesced, and NETRIGHT was nominally established in March 2000.
36   
According to its leaders, the need for NETRIGHT originates from the apparent 
organizational weaknesses of NGOs, especially their inability to come together on common 
issues and make collective demands.  Women’s organizations have been most active in the 
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provision of welfare services for women, but a few organizations have promoted legal literacy, 
gender awareness and leadership training for women.  Since the 1990s, some existing 
organizations and other newly established NGOs have become more interested in advocacy 
around gender issues, women’s participation in politics, media representation of women, and 
gender-based violence.  However, these efforts have lacked continuity and were undermined by a 
perception that NGO agendas are donor-driven and not grounded in local priorities.  NETRIGHT 
was intended to address these organizational weaknesses: 
We are knowledgeable, we have positions on things, but we are not able to articulate them within the space 
in a way which is effective; NETRIGHT is an attempt to become more effective (Tsikcata, interviewed 
22/08/01). 
 
Although NETRIGHT recently emerged, its activism around the serial killings of women 
in 2000 heightened its publicity and led to its involvement in other issues.  For example, the NPP 
government’s intention to create a women’s ministry captured NETRIGHT’s attention.  In 
January 2001, NETRIGHT issued a press statement to President Kufour voicing its desire to 
work with the new government to promote the rights, needs and concerns of Ghanaian women 
and to explore ways in which NETRIGHT can be involved in discussions on the proposed 
Ministry of Women’s Affairs.  The government invited all ‘stakeholders’, including 
NETRIGHT, to a consultation on the proposed ministry.  NETRIGHT called the proposed 
consultation a “welcomed departure from practices of the past two decades which were 
characterized by undemocratic decision-making about issues which concern women” 
(“Statement by NETRIGHT…”, 14/05/01).  After the consultation, some members expressed 
concern over the pre-prepared consultant documents and the large presence of UN staff and 
foreign experts, which undermined any local ownership of whatever policy and strategy 
documents were produced.  Significantly, NETRIGHT put forth the only organized response to 
the government’s announcement of the women’s ministry. 
A second issue in which NETRIGHT has begun to participate involves the Lands 
Administration Project.  This project, funded by the World Bank, has commissioned a Social 
Assessment Study to “enable all the major stakeholders in land administration to be consulted on 
the likely social impacts of the Project” (Letter to NETRIGHT, 02/08/01).  A team of World 
Bank and government staff met with NETRIGHT members to explain the Project.  By the time 
my fieldwork ended, further meetings had not taken place.  However, some NETRIGHT 
members voiced a general skepticism concerning the potential of such consultations, perceiving 
the government and World Bank’s notion of ‘consultations’ as polite requests for approval and 
support.  NETRIGHT has registered a certain presence in national life, but its membership is still 
small and fluctuating. 
 
5.3   The New Landscape of Civil Society 
 
The changing political context of the Fourth Republic and its concomitant changes in 
actors and their objectives comprise the new landscape of civil society.  The continued presence 
of active organizations such as the TUC and NUGS on the political scene evinces the substantial 
effects of past politicization outlined in Chapter Four.  The exit of other organizations from the 
political scene such as the GBA and ARPB may be linked to the middle-class base of these 
organizations and their previous advocacy for liberal political rights.  The arrival of new 
organizations such as ISODEC and TWN disclose the contours of current struggles in Ghanaian 
society sketched in this chapter.  Advocacy around social and economic rights and the ‘civil 
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‘democracy’ discourse.  A significant factor in this shift is the 1992 constitution, which provides 
both the substance and legitimacy for advocacy in general, and rights-based activism in 
particular.
37  
The new landscape of civil society exhibits both continuities and changes with past 
collective action. Indicative more of the changes occurring in civil society, the most commonly 
expressed objectives and expected outcomes include educating society and/or members, the 
production of local research and capacity building.  In response to past information monopolies 
and distortions, organizations are seeking to educate themselves and others based on reliable 
information.  Additionally, increased advocacy activity by new and old organizations has 
accompanied the transition to constitutional, multiparty politics.  This feature fits nicely with the 
civil society theory of donor agencies, and thus they tend to provide funding for these activities. 
Second, alliances between organizations to achieve common objectives remain a 
permanent feature of the civil society, only the precise objectives have changed.  In the Fourth 
Republic, organizations seem to form coalitions to increase the efficacy of their lobbying efforts.  
When asked why they joined CivisoC, members typically referred to the notion of ‘strength in 
numbers’.  Strength derives from the perception of government.  Therefore, CivisoC and 
NETRIGHT attempt to present themselves as organized, unified and numerical large with a 
common response on a specific issue, in order to increase the probability that government will 
not only acknowledge but also respond to their opinions.  Notably, the coalitions in this study 
have tried to link established, reputable organizations with newer ones, so as to lend legitimacy 
to advocacy activities within an environment where the general attitude towards advocacy 
remains ambiguous.  It is exactly this ambiguity that causes social organizations to call upon the 
idea of civil society. 
Third, social groups continue to be concerned with exclusion from decision-making.  
CivisoC members emphasized becoming an equal party in national economic policy, where the 
World Bank and P/NDC government have for so long had a monopoly.  The effects of long-term 
exclusion led to the need for economic literacy and for more intellectuals willing to undertake 
research on alternative economic policy.  Individuals involved in SAPRI also noted that 
government leaders did not seriously consider participation in policy outside the confines of 
technocrats and foreign advisors in the ministries.  NETRIGHT members emphasized past 
exclusion resulting from the 31st December Women’s Movement’s control over resources and 
information, and they drew attention to current manifestations of exclusion resulting from the 
government’s preference for consultants to formulate policies.
38  In both case studies, identifying 
exclusion as part of the problem gives rise to solutions demanding inclusion, solutions that come 
packaged in the discourse of participation and ownership and legitimized by the idea of civil 
society. 
As we saw in Chapter Three, agencies like the World Bank and USAID employ a 
selective approach to funding ‘civil society organizations’ according to their own civil society 
theory or their objective of building a constituency for economic reforms.  Parts of civil society 
do to some extent reflect how the agendas of donor agencies manifest themselves in the contours 
of Ghanaian society.  Most organizations lack material and organizational resources, such that 
any substantial increase in access to resources can shift or expand an organization’s objectives 
                                                  
37 The 1992 constitution contains ‘Directive Principles of State Policy’ which commands the state to adhere to 
specific political, economic, social and cultural objectives, although these principles are not justiciable (Afari-Gyan 
1993).  ISODEC specifically refers to these Directive Principles in its literature on rights-based development. 
38 Referencing their frequent interaction with citizens as part of their jobs, some members felt more knowledgeable 
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and its effectiveness in achieving those objectives.  Changes within an organization also affect its 
position in society as a whole and in relation to other organizations.  These changes may be most 
pronounced in advocacy work, where the loudest voice gets heard first.   
While external funding factors into the new landscape of civil society in Ghana, its 
impact should not overshadow the agency of social organizations to maintain their objectives and 
to use the resources of international actors, which could not be acquired at the domestic level, as 
additional leverage.  While civil society as idea is a new terrain of struggle over economic and 
political reforms, the relationship between donors and local organizations is a dynamic one.  For 
example, SAPRI occurred in Ghana because local NGOs joined a global coalition that had 
effectively put pressure on Western governments and the World Bank, leading the Bank to then 
approach the Ghana government.  International pressure was able to get the NDC government to 
do something that local pressure from organized social forces could not.  However, SAPRI in 
Ghana took on a life of its own.  While it may not have achieved the goals defined by 
international NGOs, the SAPRI exercise became an instrument for local actors to accomplish 
their own objectives.  
The metaphor of space surfaces frequently in conversation with members of social 
organizations.  They often point out the need for government to ‘make space’ or ‘create space’ 
for other voices, other ideas and other interests.  The demand for ‘space’ rejects the 
government’s model of ‘civil society’ in which they should support government policy rather 
than challenge, criticize or propose alternatives to it.  The term ‘space’ was encountered most 
frequently in the case of SAPRI: 
SAPRI is a process whereby civil society wanted space….we wanted an opportunity to interact with 
government and the World Bank, so that those issues, matters of concern to us, would be articulated at the 
forum (Nyoagbe, interviewed 25/09/01). 
 
I never saw SAPRI as offering the basis of any sustained relations with the World Bank.  I saw it as an 
opportunity to legitimize space for advocacy around certain issues (Graham, interviewed 29/08/01). 
 
The metaphor of space appears to capture the notion of the government releasing control and 
sharing power over decision-making, as well as the desire to reduce the influence of the World 
Bank in national policy formulation.  Significantly, the opening of space has led to the demand 
for more space: when people are allowed to speak, they want what they say to be taken seriously.   
While substantial changes have taken place in the political system, the metaphor of space 
maintains salience because the political sphere is not as open as it appears: 
It is not as something terrible will happen to you, should you speak, because we have a more open political 
atmosphere, but inside that openness is what I see as a growing intolerance.  It’s like some kind of forced 
consensus (Tsikcata, interviewed 22/08/01). 
 
The first democratic change of government in Ghanaian history after the 2000 elections did not 
necessarily result in increased political participation: participation remains an object of struggle.  
Evidence to support this interpretation draws on the currently contentious issue of water 
privatization, where many organizations have allied to challenge the government’s policy.  In 
September 2001, the government ran an advert advising Ghanaians to ignore ISODEC’s 
criticism of government policy to privatize the urban water sector.
39  The government’s actions 
attacking the credibility of one organization warns against exaggerating recent changes in state-
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society relations.  The metaphor of space can be seen as discursive evidence of a power struggle 
between government and organized social forces over the definition of their roles in society.   
 
5.4  Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to demystify what is referred to as ‘civil society’ in Ghana by 
deconstructing it and showing how its parts link up to past processes of mobilization and past 
objectives of social groups, while also showing how its parts take on new forms, objectives and 
actors within the changing political context in the Fourth Republic.  Social groups and their 
organizations partly adapt to the changing political context initiated by political elites, but partly 
drive those changes by their actions within the room they have to maneouvre at any given time.
40  
The experiences and historical memory of the social organizations remaining politically active 
under constitutional rule and the orientation of new organizations towards influencing and 
participating in national policymaking play a crucial part in this later aspect of political change.  
For instance, local research and advocacy efforts intended to substantiate policy demands and 
build public awareness demonstrate changes in the organizational capabilities of social 
organizations as well as the way these improvements can alter the state-civil society relationship.  
As another example, the presentation of a draft policy on NGO-state relations to the NDC 
executive in 2000 after a process of countrywide consultations contrasts with previous dictatorial 
legislation the NDC government tried to enact in 1995.41   
Labeling these processes as ‘civil society’ or these organizations as ‘civil society 
organizations’ does not radically change them: it is the label that is new.  At the same time, the 
idea of civil society has influenced the perceptions of actors about these processes and the ways 
in which they engage in them.  Therefore, a critical new feature of civil society as process in the 
1990s is the affect of civil society as idea on this process.  We see that the idea tends to be linked 
with advocacy activities and lobbying efforts as well as with notions of participation and 
representation, in order to legitimize the demands of and actions by various social organizations.   
For example, the idea of civil society embodied in SAPRI facilitated the efforts of local 
organizations to alter the balance of power of the terrain on which they must engage the 
government or the World Bank; it legitimized their right to be there ‘at the table’ to discuss 
macroeconomic policy.  Additionally, the acceptance of civil society as idea by all actors and the 
financial resources to which the idea can provide access together produce real effects in the 
political sphere. 
As a new tool in the struggle over participation and exclusion, civil society as idea has 
become part of the terrain of struggle outside of any one actor.  It is more an idiom—an 
expression that has become established in language and has a meaning that cannot be derived 
from its individual elements.  ‘Civil society’ can only be given a meaning by those using it to 
realize their objectives and within the context it is being used.  The following quote from a paper 
given at a SAPRI forum illustrates this point: 
The time has now come for Civil Society organizations through SAPRI, to ensure that they seize control of 
the Good Governance Agenda and imbue it with a content compatible with the interest of African peoples.  
                                                  
40 Akwetey (1998) argues that the rejection of violence by the domestic political elite has been crucial to the 
progress of democratization.  Therefore, political will must be seen as a major factor contributing to the changing 
political context. 
41 Between November 1999 and October 2000, a National Consultative Group constituted of government 
representatives and NGOs developed proposals for a draft policy that were then circulated for discussion among 
‘stakeholders’ at the local level, and then a final draft was endorsed at a national conference.  This process was 
carried out with the assistance of a local consulting team at the Institute for Democratic Governance.   See “Draft 
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Civil society has a right to demand that both donors and recipients of aid be accountable and transparent in 
their dealings with the people (Jonah, “From Sappery to SAPRI”). 
 
The next chapter summarizes how civil society as idea affects civil society as process and the 
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Chapter 6 
Understanding Civil Society in Africa 
 
Civil society as idea has recently been retrieved from history, and the construction of its 
genesis and genealogy has become the task of many scholars.  The contemporary popularity of 
‘civil society’ among academics as a concept to explain political processes in Africa is not new 
but rather the latest reinvention of a concept which has always been evoked in times of social 
disillusion.  Chapter Three showed how the predominance of civil society as idea among 
Western and African academics emerges from its ability to provide a common language for 
theorizing about a new democracy based on the struggle of the ordinary people.  However, these 
visions of ‘meaningful’ democracy vary, and thus civil society as idea becomes a normative 
battleground for ideologies and notions of rightness.  When such theories take on an analytical 
guise, the effect is to obfuscate rather than illuminate what is actually going on. 
What is new in this history of civil society as idea concerns its widespread use outside the 
realm of academia and intellectual discourse, in other words, its permeation into ‘lay 
knowledge’.  Civil society as idea is no longer divorced from the agency of the groups it purports 
to describe.  There is a connection between civil society as idea and civil society as process in 
Ghana.  In one way, civil society as idea affects reality in that it influences the perceptions and 
actions of multiple categories of actors who are incorporated in existing processes in civil 
society.  In another way, civil society as idea obscures these dynamic processes that have a 
history dating back to the mobilization of social groups during the nationalist movement.  This 
chapter elaborates on these conclusions, displayed in Chart 6.1.  It also explores their broader 
implications for understanding civil society in Africa and their relevance for notions of 
‘democracy’. 
Chart 6.1 
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6.1 The Construction of ‘Civil Society’  
 
One manifestation of the influence of civil society as idea on reality is the construction of 
‘civil society’ in Ghana.  This construction is the outcome of a process in which donor agencies, 
international NGOs, the government and social organizations all actively engage in the discourse 
of civil society and use the idea to legitimize their actions.  It is a civil society both informed by 
theory and by its own logic based on historical processes.  From the case of Ghana we can 
generalize its implications for other African countries. 
For African governments, ‘civil society’ is a response to increasingly articulate demands 
from sections of society for greater representation and participation in decision-making and 
policy formulation.  In Ghana, government officials appear to believe that ‘consulting civil 
society’ will lead to less opposition to government policies.  Civil society may be proclaimed as 
necessary for democracy, but it remains in the last instance subordinate to the government. 
For donor agencies, ‘civil society’ is both a means and an end.  It is a means of 
influencing African governments to adopt reforms aimed towards economic liberalization 
without falling prey to past criticisms.  Instead of directly interfering in national policymaking 
through strict conditionalities, the new politics of adjustment perceives civil society as a terrain 
on which it can build a constituency able to sway the government through policy analysis or 
lobbying efforts.  Against a theoretical backdrop in which both the state and the market have 
failed to provide a cure for Africa’s problems, civil society is an end in itself.  Civil society is the 
new solution for democratic governance and a vibrant economy. 
For international NGOs, ‘civil society’ links citizens around the world in a common 
struggle against the evil of the day, whether it be the overbearing state or poverty inducing 
economic policies.  For the most outspoken organizations, civil society is a third player on the 
international scene and a force to be reckoned with; if governments and international financial 
institutions do not improve their records, civil society will challenge them.
42  For less ambitious 
organizations, civil society is a way to reach the people and help them help themselves. 
For social organizations, ‘civil society’ is a tool for mobilization and legitimation.  
Advocacy organizations need the capacity to mobilize, for politics is about strength and 
influence.  Civil society as idea can be employed as a common front containing an element of 
unity and facilitating the production of more concrete collective issues.  The idea is used to 
define a group of organizations and individuals in terms of who they are not.  In this case, they 
are not government officials or consultants of international institutions, but yet they feel as 
though they have just as much right and ability to participate in decision-making processes that 
these institutions monopolize.  The acceptance of the idea of civil society by these institutions 
provides social organizations with room for manoeuvre; social organizations can demand to 
participate on the grounds that they are part of ‘civil society’.  In general, civil society as idea 
provides a collective identity for diverse social organizations, and through their self-
consciousness as part of civil society, they create a common cultural frame of reference 
independent of the state around which they can coalesce.  
With the construction of civil society follows a tendency towards its institutionalization.  
African governments and donor agencies willing to involve ‘civil society’ in their policymaking 
                                                  
42 See “Stripping Adjustment Policies of Their Poverty-Reduction Clothing: A New Convergence in the Challenge 
to Current Global Economic Management,” by Doug Hellinger with Karen Hansen-Kuhn and April Fehling.  
Prepared June 2001 by the United Nations University, based on testimony presented at the United Nations Civil 
Society Hearings on Financing for Development. See http://www.developmentgap.org. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS92    Page 56 
 
processes require a stable and systematic way to do so.  They need structures to tell them where 
to go and who to talk to, and the fewer the structures the better.  The desire of social 
organizations to participate directly or gain representation in national decision-making can 
intentionally or unintentionally encourage this process of institutionalization.   
The institutionalization of ‘civil society’ may have more negative than positive 
implications.  Organizations join coalitions or networks to strengthen their position in unequal 
power relations with government and donor agencies, to create a more unified position on issues 
and to gain more influence in national decision-making.  Government and donors may then use 
this structure according to their objectives, which might contradict those expressed by the 
coalition or subordinate the coalition’s intentions to those of the more powerful partner.  The 
result can bring the coalition back to square one.   
Another implication concerns processes of representation and participation.  Notably, 
organizations are the center of attention within the discourse of civil society.  For example, 
organizations are consulted when policy formulation requires input from ‘stakeholders’ and 
organizations were invited to participate in discussions on the Ghana Poverty Reduction 
Strategy.  This has led some individuals to question the paradigm of participation held by the 
government and donor agencies: 
There is a grey area about the exact standing which defines who sits at the table to participate.  Is it because 
you happen to be organized in some organization that defines your participation, or is it because you are a 
citizen…(Graham, interviewed 29/08/01). 
 
The phrase ‘representatives of civil society’ appears frequently in the discourse of the 
government, donors and social organizations, which implies that ‘civil society organizations’ 
represent some constituency.  Government officials and donor agency staff appear to assume that 
when they are consulting members of social organizations, they are consulting them as 
representatives of a larger constituency.  The claims of some social organizations to represent 
large sections of society at the national level validate this assumption and lend legitimacy to the 
government’s actions.   
Civil society as idea contains the potential for both emancipation and domination.  The 
domination potential arises from the power relations behind the construction of ‘civil society’ 
and the codification of particular strains of social theory into policy and political practices by 
those academics and ‘development professionals’ that seek the realization of their own vision of 
a ‘better’ Africa.   Civil society as idea can also be emancipatory in the way that it allows social 
actors to challenge existing power structures through the rationalization of action and thus 
gradually bring about political change.  In this way, civil society as idea and civil society as 
process intersect, producing a discourse that resonates with the objectives of the government, 
donor agencies, international NGOs and social organizations.   
 
6.2  Civil society as Process and Political Change 
 
This thesis presents the concept of civil society as an ongoing process of relations among 
organized social forces, the state and specific governments, as a whole and amidst their 
constituent parts.  Any fixed definition of the content of civil society would just freeze a 
particular moment in history and privilege the relations of social forces then prevailing (Cox 
1999: 4).  In general, to understand the current dynamics of civil society in African countries, 
one must understand the historical background of its particular social groupings, the salient 
issues and past state-society relations.  In Ghana, contemporary civil society, even in its QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS92    Page 57 
 
constructed forms, must be understood as part of longer processes marked by participation, 
exclusion and manipulation of the idea of participation for the purposes of exclusion.  The 
appearance of the idea of civil society did not change these processes, but rather became another 
element in it by creating a new set of circumstances characterizing participation and exclusion. 
Chapters Four and Five indicate several ways that civil society as process can help to 
understand political change in Ghana.  First, civil society contributes to political change through 
a process whereby organized groups collectively act to redefine their relationship to the state in a 
way that allows for greater organizational autonomy or participation in national decision-making.  
Second, civil society in combination with political will, elucidates recent changes in the notion of 
political community and the parallel construction of a new principle of political accountability in 
the Fourth Republic.  The rejection of violence by the domestic political elite as the dominant 
means of politics and the concomitant shift towards dialogue requires the release of control by 
the state and a redefining of the balance of power between the state and organized social forces 
(Akwetey 1998).  This process of relinquishing total control, sharing the power of decision-
making, and opening up space to other actors through formal and informal institutions is still 
occurring in Ghana as the government and social organizations struggle over notions of 
representation and participation.  Contemporary contestations in African countries over notions 
of political community and accountability may generally appear over how to define participation 
and the roles that the government, donor agencies and social organizations should play. 
Civil society as process in Africa can be conceptualized as a counter-hegemonic project: 
a challenging of the power held by the state, and those who control it, by organized social forces 
seeking to re-appropriate some of that power.  The politics of the counter-hegemonic project are 
now expressed through the idiom of civil society.  The implications of this idiom may be that 
challenges to the existing balance of power and demands for power sharing, i.e. participation, 
must initially come from the urban-based, educated social organizations, as much as this negates 
emancipatory visions of grassroots-led social change.  Mustapha suggests that in much of rural 
Africa peasants continue to be subjugated to non-peasant forces, impeding the articulation of 
rural interests: “The central problem, therefore, is not the liberation or protection of civil society, 
but its very creation” (1998: 231).  However, this does not mean that rural social groups such as 
cocoa farmers and peasant producers can have no involvement, but rather that there must be a 
conscious effort to mobilize them, to link urban and rural reform movements.   
Other works suggest that mobilization is occurring in the rural areas through processes 
similar to those in the urban areas (Larbi Jones 2001).  For instance, in Southern Ghana the idea 
of ‘fair trade’ has combined with a history of organization by cocoa farmers to produce a 
platform for challenging traditional authority and improving their relative bargaining position in 
the cocoa trade.  It is noteworthy that the 1990s Fair Trade Movement coming from Western 
NGOs and donor agencies resonates within cocoa farming communities, but that its theories do 
not capture the dynamics of cocoa production and trade on the ground.  As a result, and as we 
have seen in this study of civil society as idea and process, the interaction of the idea of ‘fair 
trade’ and existing methods of farmer organization produces unintended consequences with both 
positive and negative implications for existing processes of participation and exclusion. 
 
6.3  Relevance for ‘Democracy’  
 
Chapter Three revealed the link in the literature between civil society as idea and 
conceptions of democracy.  Civil society is either conflated with democracy or serves as a 
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propositions, it is argued that ‘civil society’ and ‘democracy’ are both essentially contested ideas.  
In concluding, let us look at the implications of civil society as idea and civil society as process 
for ‘democracy’.  
It has been argued that the move towards ‘liberal democracy’ in Africa has more to do 
with its usefulness as a political weapon against regimes with little political accountability than 
with its suddenly revealed superiority (Chabal 1992: 31; Hutchful 1995: 75).  This observation 
holds true for Ghanaian political history, as the demand for a return to multiparty elections had 
become a standard weapon of opposition movements.  In Ghana, the search behind politics has 
not been for ‘democracy’ but for representation (Dunn quoted in Austin 1975: 12).  This 
representation has typically been sought through politicized social groups when formal 
institutions failed to provide adequate channels for articulating interests, or when formal 
institutions were dissolved and corporatist models erected for the purpose of quelling dissent 
among various sections of society.  These methods of representation have had the consequence 
of including some groups and excluding others. 
In the Fourth Republic, civil society as idea is used as an informal means to involve 
mobilized social groups in national decision-making, but this method also includes some groups 
to the exclusion of others: ‘what civil society was consulted?’ has become a frequently asked 
question.  Given the malleability of civil society as idea, neither the government nor donor 
agencies could possibly consult all of the self-declared ‘civil society’, thus providing the impetus 
to create a single structure to represent civil society.  However, democratic governance headed in 
this direction quickly reaches limits in terms of broad-based participation, hence the recurrent 
calls for increased participation by civil society. 
With the shift from violence as a means of conducting politics to more deliberative 
forms, the discussion has not only focused on electoral and constitutional questions, but also on 
social and economic ones.  More importantly, an old debate has been revived regarding the 
multiple and contested meanings of ‘democracy’, particularly the limitations of a liberal 
democracy (Hutchful 1995).  Tsikcata, a Ghanaian academic, articulates some of the issues in 
this debate: 
People think that once parties are set up, then we have a democracy, when in fact there’s not much to 
choose from with all these parties.  They all exclude women; they all exclude poor people from rural 
areas….There has to be something more than political parties.  There has to be mechanisms by which 
ordinary people get their views across (interviewed 22/08/01). 
 
Consultations with ‘civil society organizations’ and periodic national public forums currently 
serve as such mechanisms of mediation between ‘ordinary people’ and the government.  While 
these methods appear to facilitate the development of deliberative politics, they are subject to 
manipulation and control based on the government’s decisions on when, how and who should 
participate.  It remains to be seen what direction these mediations will take.   
The metaphor of space, the rhetoric of participation and the idea of civil society could 
lead to the creation of effective institutions of participation.  For example, the TUC’s conception 
of democratic workers’ participation in economic and social development in Ghana demonstrates 
how all three of these elements (space, participation and civil society) culminate in the claim to 
participate in decisions at the enterprise level and at the national level (Gumah and Agbesinyale 
2000).  The TUC has taken on a number of initiatives towards strengthening the democratic 
process in Ghana.  However, the creation of institutions for participation in national decision-
making which are not subjected to control by the government are not likely to come about 
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These conclusions from the case of Ghana, regarding the development of new institutions 
for participation to supplement its procedural and electoral democracy and the struggles they 
entail, enforce the notion that the construction of democratic institutions in Africa need not 
follow Western precedents.  No single conception of democracy can fix the boundaries of 
democratic politics nor capture the complexities of its different elements: procedure, institutions, 
public deliberation and participation (Williams 2000). 
Ideas such as civil society and democracy are not rejected for use in political analyses of 
African societies on the theoretical grounds that universal ideas do not exist.  These ideas are 
universal in the sense that they contain within them the dream of a better world.  They are 
rejected when political analyses insist on interpreting these essentially contested ideas through 
the lens of Western history and experience, and on impressing these conceptions onto African 
society through the powerful influence that Western countries and international financial 
institutions wield in the national affairs of African countries.  As we have seen, ideas contain the 









































1.  ABANTU for development  (1997/1999) 
2.  Advocates for Gender Equity—AGE   (1997) 
3.  Center for Policy Analysis—CEPA   (1993) 
4.  Forum for African Women Educationalists—FAWE  (1993) 
5.  Gender Development Institute—GDI  (1998/2000) 
6.  Gender Studies and Human Rights Documentation Center--Gender Center  (1995) 
7.  Ghana Association of Women Entrepreneurs—GAWE  (1991/1993) 
8.  Ghana Association of Voluntary Organisations in Development—GAPVOD  (1980) 
9.  Ghana National Education Campaign Coalition—GNECC (1999) 
10. Ghana National Association of Teachers—GNAT  (1951) 
11. Integrated Social Development Centre—ISODEC (1987) 
12. International Federation of Women Lawyers—FIDA  (1973) 
13. Institute of Economic Affairs—IEA  (1989/1991) 
14. Institute for Democratic Governance—IDEG  (1998/2000) 
15. National Union of Ghanaian Students—NUGS  (1964) 
16. Save the Children Fund-Ghana 
17. Third World Network-Africa (1994) 
18. The Professional Network—ProNet  (1994) 
19. Trade Union Congress—TUC  (￿1958) 
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Appendix B: 




The ten administrative regions of Ghana were divided into 6 zones, each having one seat, except 
for the northern zone which has two.  Existing regional NGO networks and the mass 
organizations with nationwide membership, the Trade Union Congress and Ghana National 
Association of Teachers, occupied these seats and composed the geographical representation of 
civil society.  One sea t was allocated to the lead organization, ISODEC, and the remaining seats 
were allocated according to the following organization categories: 
 
•  7 seats—labor movement 
•  2 seats—business sector  
•  2 seats—farmers and fisherfolk 
•  2 seats—women’s organizations 
•  3 seats—non-governmental organizations, further divided into international, development, and 
environmental NGOs 
•  2 seats—religious development associations, one seat each for Christian and Muslim organizations 
 
The specific members of CivisoC included the following organizations:
45 
 
•  Assemblies of God, Development and Relief Services-Ghana 
•  Association of Ghana Industries 
•  Association of Small Scale Industries 
•  Centre for the Development of People 
•  Civil Service Association 
•  Gender Unit/WILDAF* 
•  Ghana Association of Private and Voluntary Organizations in Development* 
•  Ghana National Association of Farmers and Fishermen 
•  Ghana National Association of Teachers* 
•  Ghana Registered Nurses Association 
•  Green Earth Organization  (Environmental NGO) 
•  Integrated Social Development Centre  (Lead organization)* 
•  Islamic Council for Development and Humanitarian Services 
•  National Union of Ghana Students* 
•  Northern Ghana Network for Development 
•  Professional Network 
•  Save the Children  (International NGO)* 
•  Third World Network-Africa* 
•  Trades Union Congress* 
•  University Teachers Association 
•  Volta Region Association of Non-Governmental Organizations 
 
                                                  
44 CivisoC had three committees: a financial committee, a technical committee, and a media committee.  There was 
also a Tripartite National Steering Committee, which consisted of civil society representatives chosen from CivisoC, 
government representative and World Bank representatives.  Members of the CivisoC technical committee were 
crucial in the research stage of the SAPRI exercise and also served on the Tripartite technical committee.  Finally, 
there was a SAPRI secretariat that handled the administrative business of the SAPRI exercise. 
45 Note that over the four years of the SAPRI exercise, organizations may have changed and the individual members 
occupying CivisoC seats definitely changed.  The asterisk denotes organizations that I interviewed.   QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS92    Page 62 
 
Appendix C: 




•  Takyiwaa Manuh*: Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana 
 
•  Dorcas Coker-Apiah*: Gender Center, WILDAF 
 
•  Kathy Cusack*: Gender Center 
 
•  Elizabeth Apkalu*: Advocates for Gender Equity 
 
•  Naa Aku Acquaye-Baddoo: METACEPT (development organization consulting firm) 
 
•  Dzodzi Tsikcata*: Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (at the 
University of Ghana), Third World Network-Africa 
 
•  Efua Hesse: MAWHN (Multidisciplinary Action Women’s Health Network) 
 
•  Veronica Kofie*: Trades Union Congress 
 

























                                                  








Date  Name  Organization  Coalition 








25/07/01  Jean Mensa  IEA, 






Yao Dogbe  GAPVOD, 
Administrative Assistant 
 










26/07/01  Bishop Akolgo  ISODEC, 
Deputy Executive Director 
 
 
27/07/01  Lucia Quachey  GAWE, 
President 
 
       
30/07/01  Edem Acquah  FAWE, 
Documentation Center Assistant 
 
 
30/07/01  Charlotte Wrigley &  
Kathleen Boohene 
















01/08/01  Gloria Ofori-Boadu  FIDA, 
President 
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15/08/01  Veronica Ayikwei-Kofie  TUC, 






Kathy Cusack  Gender Center, 





Tetteh Hormeku  TWN-Africa, 














21/08/01  Dorcas Coker-Appiah  Gender Center, 
 Executive Director & 
WILDAF, 




22/08/01  Kwesi Jonah  University of Ghana, Legon 




22/08/01  Dzodzi Tsikcata  TWN, Gender Unit & 
University of Ghana, Legon 
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28/08/01  Takyiwaa Manuh  University of Ghana, Legon 





















30/08/01  Akilagpa Sawyerr  Association of African Universities, 









25/09/01  John Nyoagbe  GNAT, 
Director of Research 
  
CivisoC 
27/09/01  Kofi Marrah  World Bank, 
Social Development Specialist 






B.A.W. Trevallion  National Development Planning 
Commission, Lead Consultant on 
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